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ABSTRACT 
This study calls for a shift in the way we think about the mode, meaning, and 
purpose of education by recognizing the aesthetic dimension. Through deepening 
Deweyan aesthetic theory with D.W. Winnicott’s ideas on the self, I am addressing a 
crucial gap in educational literature pertaining to the constitutive role of aesthetics in the 
growth and development of the self. Put simply, John Dewey’s philosophy upholds the 
idea that learning and growth is inherent in aesthetic experience because it refines the 
way we are related to the world and Winnicott’s psychoanalytic account offers this 
insight greater precision and depth by filling out a critical component that Dewey does 
not address; namely, our early interactions in the world and the development of the self. 
This approach informs both policy and practice, speaking to arts education and beyond 
by advancing the notion that there is profound learning potential embedded within 
aesthetic experience. Thus, I argue that we need to cultivate this mode of aesthetic 
learning throughout all of education.  
To make this case, I lay out Winnicott’s theory of differentiation as I see it 
relating to the work of the Deweyan scholar, Elliot Eisner in chapter two, “The 
Difference Differentiation Makes: Extending Eisner’s Account.” This offers an 
understanding that recognizes how aesthetic education continues to carry out the 
process of differentiation throughout life. In this, the self is continually refined in 
relation to the world through aesthetic experience.  
Chapter three, “Dewey's ‘Peculiar’ Mode of Human Association: Aesthetic 
Experience and Meaning,” proposes a link between aesthetic experience and meaning 
making by identifying a quality of relation that they share in common. I suggest that we 
understand this quality of relation as a literal quality of relationship, as I draw on 
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Dewey’s conviction that the establishment of partners within the “peculiar” mode of 
human association is what gives rise to intelligence and meaning. This insight is 
deepened through Winnicott’s psychoanalytic account, which fills out significant gaps 
within Dewey’s account. The linkage between aesthetic experience and meaning affords 
the insight that the quality of relation that bonds the two is precisely what we need to 
foster in education; thus, offering a valuable insight that has fundamental significance 
for education. 
Chapter four, “A Potential Basis for the Ideal: John Dewey’s Philosophy and the 
Unthought Known,” extends this discussion through consideration of Victor 
Kestenbaum’s recent work concerning the role of the ideal within Dewey’s philosophy. 
Drawing on Kestenbaum’s work, I propose what might be the developmental basis for 
understanding the role of the ideal throughout human life. Through this extremely 
broad perspective on human living, I believe we find a way to connect my educational 
project with a view of human life that is rarely considered, but nevertheless might 
explain a crucial, motivating force throughout all of our lives. 
In the final chapter, “Conclusion and Implications for Practice,” I consider what 
this approach means for educational practice and the education of teachers in particular. 
I propose that we aspire to cultivate the self of the teacher in such a way that will allow 
for teachers to extend this approach with students. I argue that it is vital to establish an 
experiential basis within teacher education for teachers to draw upon and offer 
examples from the arts to inform how this mode of education might work. In this, I 
uphold the notion that the arts have the potential to serve as the model for the rest of 
education for how we might cultivate the aesthetic mode of learning that is so central to 
education itself. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND THE SELF  
The aim of this dissertation is to articulate a theory of education and learning 
that, although deeply impactful and ubiquitous, is not typically addressed in 
educational discourse. This is problematic because in not paying attention to the subtle 
but profoundly educative nature of aesthetic experience, we are missing out on a crucial 
opportunity to more effectively facilitate experiences that are inherently and deeply 
educative. In making my case, I will be drawing from two distinct, yet compatible 
theoretical frameworks; namely, John Dewey’s philosophy and D.W. Winnicott’s 
psychoanalytic theory. Put simply, Dewey’s philosophy upholds the idea that learning 
and growth is inherent in aesthetic experience because it refines the way we are related 
to the world and Winnicott’s psychoanalytic account offers this insight greater precision 
and depth by filling out a critical component that Dewey does not address—our early 
interactions in the world and the development of the self. I will be drawing out 
connections between these two theoretical approaches throughout, but perhaps the best, 
and certainly most pragmatic, starting point rests not in theory, but in practice.  
In many ways I have been working on this project long before I ever conceived of 
the idea of writing a dissertation. Indeed, I could point to many potential beginnings, 
however, the clearest point of emergence lies in frustrations I felt as a music educator.  
Beyond the curriculum that was articulated and clearly defined, I endeavored to foster 
something more through my teaching. Yet, despite a deep conviction that this 
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“something more” was critically important, I could not satisfactorily explain what this 
was and why it was so significant. I knew this “something more” occurred within 
musical experience and that I was not alone in this intuition, as testimonies speaking to 
the immense power of music abound.1 But without a theoretical account of such 
experiences, I was extremely limited in my capacity to cultivate them, let alone attest to 
their educational significance. 
Although at the time my sights were set on the possibilities of musical 
experiences, I have come to understand that there is something more basic underlying 
experiences with music that warrants consideration and have thus shifted my focus 
away from artworks to human functioning. As such, the account detailed here applies 
well beyond the bounds of musical experience, while at the same time describing a 
mode of engagement that does not necessarily encompass all types musical encounters. I 
believe that in doing so, I have been able to address the disturbing lack of understanding 
I experienced as a music educator and, perhaps more notably, a lack in educational 
discourse to address the significance of aesthetic experience.  
Pradeep Dhillon’s work helps in this regard by clarifying the theoretical 
framework for discussing aesthetic education. Although the term aesthetic education is 
often conflated with art (or music) education, Dhillon follows both Immanuel Kant and 
John Dewey in maintaining the important distinction between them. Whereas art 
education focuses more “narrowly on the creation and appreciation of artworks in 
themselves,”2 aesthetic education addresses the much wider realm of the role aesthetics 
plays in all human functioning. “This is not to exclude artworks but to recognize them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Examples of such testimonies can be found: http://blog.kexp.org/why-music/ (KEXP and AIR, “Why 
Music Matters: Stories about the Power of Music.”)  
2 Pradeep Dhillon, “Aesthetic Education,” in A Companion to Aesthetics, Second edition, ed. Stephen Davies, 
et al. (Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 114. 
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instead as just one form of human activity that engages us aesthetically.”3 The shift in 
focus from artworks to human functioning changes more than just the object of study—
it alters the types of claims that emerge. Thus, considerations of aesthetic education 
speak to the core of our functioning and therefore have bearing on all educational 
pursuits at a foundational level.  
This offers a nuanced argument in support of the arts. Rather than collapsing 
into either of two rather clichéd arguments, this approach is situated in between them. 
Hence, at one extreme we find arguments that are all too instrumental (no pun intended) 
that make claims like “Young people who are involved in making music in their teenage 
years score 100 points higher on the SATs than those who don't play music.”4 This claim, 
substantiated by the American Music Conference, was offered as a selling point for 
piano lesson software. Although I do not know how successful this approach is as a 
marketing tactic for musical lesson software, it is certainly not successful in upholding 
the value of music or learning in the arts more generally because it has nothing to do 
with the value of the arts in themselves. However, at the other extreme we find an 
argument that is only slightly better. The so-called “art for arts sake” argument has the 
benefit of relying on value that may be found within the arts, but the only influence this 
basic argument has lies with those who are already convinced. In this, we find the case 
in which we are (literally) preaching to the choir.  
But in recognizing the inherent place of aesthetics within human functioning, 
claims emerge that far surpass either of these approaches.  Accordingly such an 
approach has the benefit of tapping into what is special about the arts (i.e. they offer us 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid.	  
4 meridee calder, “Classical Music Study Improves SAT Scores for Teens,” http://piano-lesson-software-
review.toptenreviews.com/classical-music-study-improves-sat-scores-for-teens.html  
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peak manifestations within experience of our aesthetic grounding in the world) while at 
the same time addressing a realm beyond the art museum or the concert hall by 
speaking to who and how we are in the world. Indeed, it is for this reason that Dewey 
contends that the idea of art for arts sake would not have been understood in Ancient 
Greece, for example, and should not be understood today. As such, Dewey affords that 
within the context of Ancient Greece “no contemporary would have doubted that music 
was an integral part of the ethos and the institutions of the community.”5 Dewey later 
extends this idea, offering that within the ancient context  
[The arts] connected things that were overtly important and overtly done with 
the substantial life of the community. Art was in them, for these activities 
conformed to the needs and conditions of the most intense, most readily grasped 
and longest remembered experience. But they were more than just art, although 
the esthetic strand was ubiquitous.6 
 
Likewise, the approach I am supporting seeks to more fully integrate the 
aesthetic mode of learning (and living) into education and as a consequence I believe 
that the arts emerge as preeminent examples of what we should be aspiring for within 
education and indeed within all of life. Hence, to the extent that arts education programs 
tap into and cultivate the potential for learning embedded within aesthetic experience, 
they stand to pave the way for unlocking profound learning potential that can be 
extended to all areas of education. As such, I believe the arts, above other domains, offer 
great potential in serving as the model we need for all of education. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 John Dewey, Art as Experience (1934; repr. New York: Perigee, 2005), 6. Dewey also made this point again in 
a more contemporary context in (the Works Progress Administration) in his 1940, “Art as our Heritage,” In 
J. A. Boydston (Ed.), The Collected Works of John Dewey, The Later works, 1925-1953 Vol. 14, 1939–1941, 
Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, pp. 255–257. 
6 Dewey, Art as Experience, 341.	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Literature Review 
My research speaks to the educative value of aesthetic experience from a 
Deweyan perspective. Although this has not been a dominant discussion, the idea that 
aesthetic experience has educative value has been established within philosophy of 
education with Maxine Greene, Phillip W. Jackson, and Elliot Eisner leading the 
conversation.7 Accordingly, I will briefly review literature within the field to show how 
my project relates to previous developments. 
Maxine Greene stands out as a philosopher of education who places a great deal 
of value on experiential learning. This value shines through in her rich examples of 
educational encounters with art works in Variations on a Blue Guitar: The Lincoln Center 
Institute Lectures on Aesthetic Education, substantiating the claim that aesthetic experience 
can be deeply educative. While Greene offers a great deal of depth to claims about the 
educative potential of aesthetic experience through her fruitful descriptions, her 
conception of aesthetic education is limited to the arts, defining aesthetic education as: 
an intentional undertaking designed to nurture, appreciative, reflective, cultural, 
participatory engagements with the arts by enabling learners to notice what is 
there to be noticed, and to lend works of art their lives in such a way that they 
can achieve them as variously meaningful.8 
 
While this conception of aesthetic education certainly upholds the educative value of 
aesthetic experience, I have concerns about Greene’s concentration being limited to the 
arts. My concerns rest not with Greene’s philosophical account itself, but rather with the 
way this limited focus on art functions in two different respects.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In addition to these philosophers, I would also add Bennett Reimer as an important philosopher of music 
education. See, Bennett Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision, Third Edition (Upper 
Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003). 
8 Dewey, Art as Experience, 6.	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My first worry is that this limited focus on works of art perpetuates the very 
separation between artworks and everyday living that Dewey endeavored to counteract. 
Indeed, one of Dewey’s major aims in Art as Experience is to “restore continuity between 
the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday 
events, doings, and sufferings that are usually recognized to constitute experience.”9 
Dewey expands on this idea through metaphor in saying, “Mountain peaks do not float 
unsupported; they do not even rest upon the earth. They are the earth in one of its 
manifest operations.”10 Thus, while there is nothing inherently problematic in focusing 
on the intense, peak examples of aesthetic experience that artworks often facilitate, I 
think it is important to recognize that these peak examples are not separate from our 
everyday functioning. Indeed, these examples are peak precisely because they are vitally 
connected to the manner of our being in the world, as organisms interacting with 
environments and growing through and as a result of this interaction. Of course, Greene 
in no way undermines this claim as she herself attests that “the arts awaken [us] to the 
process of living itself,”11 however, her limited focus on artworks does not reveal the full 
extent to which this is the case and could function to reinforce the false separation 
between the arts and everyday life that Dewey sought to dissolve.  
My second concern is that her limited focus on artworks also limits the potential 
impact of her claims. In only speaking to the educative potential of experience with 
artworks, Greene’s account does not address the broader educational importance of 
aesthetic experience in all learning. Thus, while I recognize the valuable contribution 
that Greene and others offer through rich portrayals of peak educational experiences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid., 2. 
10 Ibid.	  
11 Maxine Green, Variations on a Blue Guitar: The Lincoln Center Institute Lectures on Aesthetic Education (New 
York: Teachers College Press, 2001), 63.  
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with artworks, I think it is important to conceptualize such accounts within the broader 
framework of aesthetic education. Accordingly, Dhillon tells us that aesthetic education 
means not only “the enhancing of our awareness of this dimension of our activities and 
experiences but also serving more humbly, but not less importantly, as a reminder of its 
pervasive presence.”12 In this, I mark a point of departure in my work as compared 
Greene’s, as I endeavor to speak to this broader dimension in connection with the peak 
manifestations that Greene so powerfully attests.   
Philip W. Jackson is another philosopher of education who focuses on art from a 
Deweyan perspective. His conception of aesthetic experience is not limited to 
interactions with artworks, but Jackson is chiefly interested in what the arts have to 
teach us about how to live our lives. Jackson addresses both the general reader and 
educators in particular, drawing out practical implications of Dewey’s aesthetic theory. 
While I am also interested in drawing out implications of Dewey’s aesthetic theory and 
am focused on what this means for educators, Jackson’s concentration is more closely 
tied to practice whereas I am interested in delving deeper into key theoretical 
underpinnings.  
Nevertheless, Jackson nicely identifies the precise aspect of Dewey’s theory that I 
find to be extremely important for education in the following quotation: 
When conditions are just right or very close to it, the resultant transaction 
between self and surroundings constitutes an experience. What is special about 
such occurrences is not simply that their parts or phases hang together to form a 
whole. Nor is it simply that we find them to be momentarily satisfying. What 
adds to their importance are the enduring changes that they produce. They leave 
in their wake a changed world.13  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Dhillon, “Aesthetic Education,” 117.  
13 Philip W. Jackson, John Dewey and the Lessons of Art (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1998), 5.  
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Jackson elaborates on this point, noting changes in the world due to the existence of a 
new art object or an existing object acquiring new meanings. But of particular 
importance, he notes: 
The experiencer changes by undergoing a transformation of the self, gaining a 
broadened perspective, a shift in attitude, an increase of knowledge, or any of a 
host of other enduring alterations of a psychological nature….Another way of 
thinking about these interchanges with art objects that result in enduring 
changes in both the experiencer and the experienced is to label them educative. 
They are so, Dewey would say, because of their liberating effect on future 
experiences.14  
 
Jackson quickly moves on from this insight, leaving a great deal unpacked. While the 
changes that occur in the world are fairly manifest, the transformations occurring on the 
side of the self are less evident. I contend that it is important for the field of education to 
unravel what occurs in such transformations, as this process marks our fundamental 
orientation in the world and the mechanism through which a profound type of learning 
occurs. Although I have a great deal more to say about this, for now it will suffice to say 
that my work is complimentary to Jackson’s project and that my interests rest in the 
process of transformation that Jackson identifies in his survey of Dewey’s aesthetic 
theory.  
Similar to Jackson, David A. Granger15 ties Dewey’s theory of aesthetics to 
educational practice. Granger compellingly draws together Robert M. Pirsig’s Zen and 
the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and Dewey’s aesthetic philosophy, weaving a tale that 
shows how Dewey’s theory played out within Pirsig’s educational context, and indeed, 
how it plays out in life itself. Going beyond mere identification that “Dewey’s later 
works suggest that art and the aesthetic can assist us in recovering the full meaning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Jackson, John Dewey and the Lessons of Art, 5-6.  
15 David A. Granger, “Teaching Aesthetics and Aesthetic Teaching: Toward a Deweyan Perspective,” Journal 
of Aesthetic Education 40, no. 2 (2006): 45-66.  
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potential of the everyday for both our students and ourselves,”16 Granger shows us how 
this can work in his charming essay. Thus, Grainger’s work is a nice complement to my 
project. 
Of all the philosophers discussed, Elliot Eisner’s approach is perhaps the closest 
to mine, as our arguments parallel and complement one another, emphasizing different 
aspects of aesthetic phenomenon. Eisner is a prominent educational theorist who draws 
heavily from a Deweyan framework. While he conceives of aesthetic experience to be 
“potential in any encounter an individual has with the world,”17 Eisner places special 
emphasis on arts education and provides powerful support to the “topsy-turvy” claim 
that “the arts can serve as a model for teaching the subjects we usually think of as 
academic.”18 Eisner puts forth numerous lessons that the arts teach education in general, 
ranging from somewhat derivative arguments about the arts teaching us that “there can 
be more than one answer to a question and more than one solution to a problem,”19 to 
claims intimately connected to the experience and process of art. 
When other fields, indeed, when other activates are pursued for their aesthetic 
properties and when they are acted upon with an eye toward the generation of 
such experience, the activity or the field increasingly begins to approximate an 
artistic one. In other words, science, both its products and its 
practice….increasingly becomes a means for generating artistic forms of 
life….Thus, education can learn from the arts what it means to treat fields as 
potential art forms, and in so doing the arts become a model for [all of] 
education.20 
 
Chapter two of this dissertation is devoted to offering a full account of how my 
work extends Eisner’s account, but for now it will suffice to explain more generally how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid., 64.  
17 Elliot Eisner, The Arts and the Creation of Mind (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002), 232.  
18 Ibid., 196. Moreover, Eisner made this point for the entire profession in his AERA Presidential address: 
“Forms of Understanding and the Future of Educational Research,” Educational Researcher 22, no. 7 (1993): 5-
11. 	  
19 Ibid., 196.  
20 Ibid., 208.	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my project relates to Eisner’s work. Like Dewey, Eisner provides “a case rooted in our 
biological nature and in the achievements of our culture.”21 Both Dewey and Eisner start 
with the premise that we are biological creatures embedded in an environment that is 
both physical and cultural through which we live and grow. While we are biologically 
determined to develop in certain ways, we also rely on our environments to activate 
many of our potentials (such as language development). Eisner is particularly attuned to 
our sensory capacities and maps out a trajectory of human development that moves 
from a potential for sensory processing, through experience of the qualitative 
environment, to the ability to differentiate among qualities experienced, form concepts, 
and represent these concepts within a shared social context.22 This trajectory is important 
for Eisner’s overall argument as he ultimately makes claims about mind, of which he 
says: “The child’s developing ability to differentiate, to form concepts, and to represent 
those concepts reflects the use and growth of mind.”23 This idea is key for Eisner, as 
Arthur Efland recently surmised, “the essence of mind [for Eisner] is the process of 
forming representations of one’s experience.”24 
Continuing his argument, Eisner recognizes the immense contribution of culture, 
which determines what aptitudes will be cultivated, and also notes how representation 
influences what is experienced. In addition, Eisner emphasizes the critical role that the 
arts can play in our lives by helping us to slow down perception and savor the qualities 
of our environment in order to secure feelingful experience. Moreover, “A major aim of 
arts education is to promote the child’s ability to develop his or her mind through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Elliot Eisner, Cognition and Curriculum Reconsidered, Second Edition (New York: Teacher College Press, 
1994), 19.  
22 In particular, see Eisner, The Arts and the Creation of Mind, 20-22.  
23 Eisner, The Arts and the Creation of Mind, 22.  
24 Aruthur Efland, “The Arts and the Creation of Mind: Eisner's Contributions to the Arts in Education,” 
Journal of Aesthetic Education 38, no. 4 (2004): 76. 
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experience that the creation or perception of expressive form makes possible.”25 Thus, 
Eisner tells us that the arts have an essential role to play in all education, as he 
understands education to be “a process of learning how to become the architect of your 
own experience and therefore learning how to create yourself.”26 
Interestingly, the trajectory that I follow begins in the same place that Eisner does 
and ends with similar conclusions, however in the interim we diverge by placing 
emphasis on differing aspects of aesthetic development. Thus, a major distinction 
between my work and that of Eisner is the point in development in which we focus our 
sights. Where Eisner moves on to look at the work of school age children, I believe that 
there are much earlier developments that warrant significant attention. Thus, for my 
purposes, Einser skips over a significant development that occurs between our initial 
experiencing of the qualitative environment in infancy to the ability to differentiate 
qualitative aspects of experience. I contend that this is not an insignificant omission, as 
the process through which we realize the capacity to make distinctions forms the basis 
of all our aesthetic encounters. Hence, while developing this capacity may not be 
unusual, it is no less momentous. Put simply, what Eisner’s analysis does not address is 
that before we can make distinctions about our environment we must first achieve some 
kind of working capacity to differentiate what is “me” from what is “not me.” This 
developmental point not only marks the initial emergence of what Eisner refers to as 
mind, but also of self.  I believe it is especially important to take the notion of self into 
account given Eisner’s conclusion about the role the arts can play in “learning how to 
create yourself.” Indeed, this is precisely the point in which my work joins up again with 
Eisner, as I believe that this is a core insight that my work seeks to address and deepen.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Eisner, The Arts and the Creation of Mind, 24.  
26 Ibid., 24.  
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Learning through Aesthetic Experience 
This project grows out of Dewey’s insight that learning and growth is inherent in 
aesthetic experience. Through the use of the term aesthetic (or as Dewey wrote—
“esthetic”), Dewey is calling attention to our intimate connection with our surroundings. 
Indeed, the experienced rhythms of falling in and out of step with our surroundings 
form the basis of aesthetic knowing and it is through this rhythmic aesthetic flux that we 
learn and grow. Dewey offers a basic example of this unfolding in the beginning of Art 
as Experience. 
Every need, say hunger for fresh air or food, is a lack that denotes at least a 
temporary absence of adequate adjustment with surroundings. But it is also a 
demand, a reaching out into the environment to make good the lack and to 
restore adjustment by building at least a temporary equilibrium. Life itself 
consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step with the march of 
surrounding things and then recovers unison with it—either through effort or by 
some happy chance. And, in a growing life, the recovery is never mere return to 
a prior state, for it is enriched by the state of disparity and resistance through 
which it has successfully passed. If the gap between organism and environment 
is too wide, the creature dies. If its activity is not enhanced by the temporary 
alienation, it merely subsists. Life grows when a temporary falling out is a 
transition to a more extensive balance of the energies of the organism with those 
of the conditions under which it lives.27 
 
Thus, moments of lack, moments of temporary disharmony and rupture, are 
opportunities for a kind of profound growth that is intimately rooted in our connection 
with the environment. In aesthetic experience, we attend closely to this connection and 
the rhythms of this interchange—rhythms that perhaps become most literally manifest 
in the case of musical experience. Indeed, it is through attending to this rhythmic 
process and contending with the moments in which we temporarily fall out of step with 
our surroundings that learning and growth unfolds within aesthetic experience.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Dewey, Art as Experience, 12-13.  
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This basic insight lies at the core of my project. Thus, I am interested in knowing 
more about how this process of self/world transaction plays out and I offer particular 
emphasis on the side of the self in order to attain greater precision in understanding this 
of this mode of learning. In this, Dewey offers a good place to start:  
Whenever anything is undergone in consequence of a doing, the self is modified. 
The modification extends beyond acquisition of greater facility and skill. 
Attitudes and interests are built up which embody in themselves some deposit of 
the meaning of things done and undergone. These funded and retained 
meanings become a part of the self.28 
 
And it is thus that the self becomes educated through aesthetic experience.  
Examples of this type of unfolding are vast, ranging from encounters such as lack 
in very basic needs of life (e.g. hunger for food or fresh air, as Dewey indicated above), 
to more complex and subtle unfoldings such as attending closely to a symphony and 
taking in its rhythmic flow. However, a particularly good example appears in a recent 
article by Aaron Stoller entitled, “Educating from Failure: Dewey’s Aesthetics and the 
Case for Failure in Educational Theory.”29 In this, Stoller tells the story of Sadie, a college 
student who encounters a significant rupture when she is not admitted to graduate 
school. Stoller offers Sadie’s story as an example of how moments of failure offer unique 
potential for cultivating the capacity for creative thought and action. In this, Stoller 
exemplifies this mode of aesthetic learning as he contends, “When done productively, 
creating meaning and value from the moment of failure is no different from artistic 
creation, both of which rely on a sophisticated ability to intuit and work from the 
affective background of thought.”30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid., 275. 
29 Aaron Stoller, “Educating from Failure: Dewey’s Aesthetics and the Case for Failure in Educational 
Theory,” Journal of Aesthetic Education 47, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 22-35. 
30 Ibid., 26.  
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We encounter Sadie in her initial moment of deep failure after she received her 
final rejection letter—“in an instant she was overcome by the realization that everything 
she had planned and hoped for was no longer a possibility.”31 Through Sadie’s story, 
Stoller does a wonderful job of exemplifying this aesthetic mode of learning. Indeed, we 
follow Sadie through this deep failure in a process of healing that eventually culminates 
as Sadie comes to understand herself anew through self-reflection and narrative 
re/visioning. In this, Sadie refines her relationship with the world through creative acts 
of meaning making, enacting a very deep process of learning and growth.  
[For Sadie,] the process resolved in her realizing that the original goal of doctoral 
study was not true to many of her own beliefs about the world and did not play 
to her unique talents and skills. She was able to honor her past choices—which 
she originally felt were rendered worthless in light of the rejection—by bringing 
them forward into a new re/visioned future and gained a newfound confidence 
in her own creative abilities.32 
 
Thus, the type of learning I am interested in unfolds through an aesthetic process 
such as the one Sadie experienced in transaction with the world. This is a process that 
we, as aesthetic beings, continually enact as we encounter and move through ruptures 
that are both large and small. Furthermore, I believe that we should attend to this 
process carefully in order to better understand and support this mode of learning. 
Indeed, this is precisely my aim herein.  
I find it significant that Stoller points to friendship as the catalyst for they type of 
learning and healing that Sadie required after her moment of deep failure. In this, 
Stoller’s approach is precisely in line with what I have in mind. Hence, my turn to 
psychoanalytic theory supports this move in coming to understand the importance of 
relationships in initially developing the capacity to make meaning and subsequently in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid., 28.	  
32 Ibid. 33.	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supporting the process of meaning making—whether it be through the internalization of 
prior relational experience or more overtly, as Stoller exemplifies through Sadie’s story. 
This idea will be fleshed out more in chapter three, however it is helpful at this point to 
note the ways that Stoller identifies friendship as the catalyst for this process. Hence, 
Stoller offers that friendship is precisely what enables the reconstitution of self within 
community—a necessary component of healing after deep failure—because our friends 
know our unique talents, skills, and abilities in a way that often surpasses our own view 
of ourselves. Thus, the very personalized insights that only our friends can offer give us 
a way to move forward as we rework our self-narrative in relation to the moment of 
failure.  
But what I find most striking of all is within Stoller’s account is his suggestion 
that when we lack a habit of our own to keep us moving forward through a difficult 
situation, we can be set in motion once again by borrowing the habit of a friend. Thus, 
Stoller offers, “In many cases friendship in this moment involves not simply habit 
formation but habit sharing. The caretaking friend my help her suffering friend by 
simply setting him in the motion of habit, offering her own habit if the suffering friend 
has none available.”33 This is again precisely inline with the approach I am taking in 
turning to psychoanalytic theory. Although Heinz Kohut is not a major figure in my 
dissertation taken as a whole, his notion of transmutting internalization is worth 
mentioning here, as it comes very close to this idea and offers a high degree of precision 
in understanding how this kind of growth unfolds within the self. Hence, transmutting 
internalization is a process in which the self contends with lack by absorbing aspects of 
previously experienced others into the self. Indeed, by literally incorporating habits of 
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others into the self and satisfying the moment of rupture we build new habits, or, as 
Kohut would say, we build self-structure. The reason I believe it is important that we 
recognize the role of friendship in reforming our habits is because this points to the role 
a teacher might play in supporting this mode of learning. As such, a significant role of 
the teacher would be to nurture moments of rupture in order to help students attend to 
and move through moments in which they fall out step with their surroundings.  
These moments of rupture—that is, falling out of step with the environment—
occur at a scope that is both large and small. As such, Stoller’s depiction offers a strong 
place to start in offering a concrete example of deep failure that we can readily identify 
and relate to. However, this is not to suggest that this type of unfolding only occurs at 
this degree of magnitude. Indeed, this ubiquitous process is constantly unfolding largely 
undetected and unseen. But this lack of recognition is no indication of lack in 
significance and indeed profundity, as this mode of learning lies at the core of our 
selfhood. 
Overview 
The chapters that follow fall out of an observation that Dhillon afforded in her 
brief sketch of the philosophical literature dealing with aesthetics in which she noted 
that for Dewey “only those aesthetic experiences would be considered educative that 
foster more meaningful experiences.”34 This insight invites a number of further 
questions that Dhillon does not engage about the educative potential of aesthetic 
experience and thus marks a point of emergence for my work. Accordingly, my 
examination continues on in this trajectory, expanding on this insight to provide a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Dhillon, “Aesthetic Education,” 116.  
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deeper understanding of what constitutes meaningful experiences, how this relates to 
aesthetic experience, and how this deeper understanding informs the field of education. 
In chapter two, “The Difference Differentiation Makes: Extending Eisner’s 
Account,” I address these questions in relation to Eisner’s account. This accomplishes a 
number of things. First, this marks the place in which my account diverges from 
Eisner’s, showing precisely the point at which I believe further consideration is 
warranted. Second, in explaining how my project diverges from Eisner’s account, I lay 
out Winnicott’s theory of differentiation. This is particularly important because in laying 
out Winnicott’s approach I am establishing a theoretical foundation that I will be 
drawing on throughout this dissertation. In this, I am also indicating my point of 
departure from Dewey’s project as well. Third, I reconnect Winnicott’s approach with 
Eisner’s. In tying this back together, I am offering a nuanced perspective for 
understanding acts of meaning making and aesthetic experience that I find to be 
compatible with a Deweyan approach. Extending Eisner’s account in this way offers an 
understanding aesthetic education that recognizes how aesthetic education continues to 
carry out the process of differentiation throughout life. In this, the self is continually 
refined in relation to the world through aesthetic experience.  
Chapter three is entitled, “Dewey's ‘Peculiar’ Mode of Human Association: 
Aesthetic Experience and Meaning.” This is a crucial chapter for my overall argument 
because it links aesthetic experience and meaning making through a quality of relation. I 
propose that we understand this quality of relation as a literal quality of relationship, as 
I draw on Dewey’s conviction that the establishment of partners within the “peculiar” 
mode of human association is what gives rise to intelligence and meaning. I deepen 
Dewey’s discussion by turning to Winnicott’s psychoanalytic account, which fills out 
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significant aspects of Dewey’s approach. Furthermore, Winnicott’s theory proves 
significant in linking aesthetic experience and meaning through detailing the way 
immediate sensation becomes transformed into meaning within the establishment of 
partners. In linking aesthetic experience and meaning, a valuable insight comes to the 
fore that has fundamental significance for education. Hence, this approach offers that 
the quality of relation that bonds aesthetic experience and meaning is precisely what we 
need to foster in education. This connects well with the insight Stoller offers above in 
pointing to friendship as the catalyst for the aesthetic mode of learning and offers an 
important perspective that I believe we urgently need in education. 
Chapter four, “A Potential Basis for the Ideal: John Dewey’s Philosophy and the 
Unthought Known,” extends this discussion through consideration of recent scholarship 
within the field of philosophy that draws out questions regarding the place of the ideal 
within Dewey’s philosophy taken as a whole. In this, I follow Victor Kestenbaum in 
examining the relation of imagination and reality throughout Dewey’s philosophy. As 
Kestenbaum opens up the space for questions to take root concerning the role of the 
ideal within Dewey’s philosophy, I use the space that Kestenbaum affords as an 
opportunity to propose what might be the developmental basis for understanding the 
role of the ideal throughout human life. In this, I am looking very broadly at what might 
be the motivating, moving, driving force of this educational approach and indeed 
human life itself. Through this extremely broad perspective on human living, I believe 
we find a way to connect my educational project with a view of human life that is rarely 
considered, but nevertheless might explain a crucial, motivating force throughout all of 
our lives. 
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In closing, chapter five, “Conclusion and Implications for Practice,” considers 
what this approach means for educational practice. Indeed, such implications become 
particularly pronounced through considerations of the education of teachers. In this, we 
must consider the development of the teacher’s self such that he or she will be able to 
extend this approach with his or her own students. Thus, it is vital to establish an 
experiential basis within teacher education for teachers to draw upon. I offer suggestions 
for how we might accomplish this by discussing the scope of implementation, what an 
aesthetic method of teaching might look like, and I draw on metaphors from the arts in 
order to inform how this mode of education might work. This is particularly significant, 
as I believe the arts have the potential to serve as the model for the rest of education in 
cultivating this mode of learning.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DIFFERENCE DIFFERENTIATION MAKES:  
EXTENDING EISNER’S ACCOUNT1 
At a time when arts programs are being cut from our schools, we need to be 
reminded that the aesthetic mode of learning exemplified in the arts has fundamental 
significance to the purposes of education itself and thus has a central role to play in 
schooling. Elliot Eisner is a leading advocate of this view, and he provides convincing 
support for the contribution of the arts serving “as models of what educational 
aspiration and practice might be at its very best.”2 Eisner’s core argument makes claims 
about human cognition and asserts that the arts play a key role in the creation of mind. 
In sum, Eisner’s argument starts with the assertion that we derive the content of all 
concepts from our ability to experience different qualities of the world that we pick up 
through our senses. He thus rightly links our sensory capacities directly to cognition. For 
Eisner, the essence of mind is reflected in the process of making qualitative distinctions 
in response to the environment, forming concepts, and representing those concepts. 
Accordingly, he tells us that the arts play a critical role in the development of mind 
because they fundamentally engage a process in which “perception is refined, 
imagination stimulated, judgment fostered, and technical skills developed”3 — all of 
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2 1. Elliot W. Eisner, The Arts and the Creation of Mind (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002), 
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3 Ibid., 15.  
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which directly contribute to Eisner’s conception of mind. Hence, Eisner concludes that 
the arts are core to the mission of schooling, as they epitomize the essence of mind.  
In addition to the invaluable contribution Eisner affords through this core 
argument that reveals the formative role the arts can and do play in the creation of 
mind, there is another important theme that emerges throughout his work that is worthy 
of attention. Speaking beyond representation alone, Eisner states, “it is the process, the 
immersion in the activity itself and the quality of life that it makes possible, that should 
command more of our attention. The arts remind us of what life can be at its most 
vital”.4 This idea is present throughout Eisner’s work, addressing a realm that extends 
beyond the doings of mind alone and embracing a more encompassing notion of self. In 
this, aesthetic experience in itself proves meaningful.  
We find this idea again to be strongly present in Eisner’s assertion that “among 
the most important ideas The Arts and the Creation of Mind addresses is the idea that 
humans are meaning-making creatures. All of us wish to create meaningful 
experience.”5 And indeed, it is out of Eisner’s commitment to meaningful experience 
that he argues in support of providing access to the multiple forms of representation 
through education in the arts, as “each form of representation we employ confers its 
own features upon the meanings we make or interpret.”6 However, what I want to draw 
out is that the type of meaning making Eisner focuses on requires more than the 
workings of mind alone and relies on a prior developmental achievement, namely, the 
establishment of self-in-relation-to-world. Going further, the reason this prior 
development is important is because the subsequent meaning making Eisner attends to 
carries with it not only an echo — a repetition — of an earlier drama, but indeed a 	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6 Ibid.	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reverberation, carrying on a significant process that continues to refine self-in-relation-
to-world. In this, we find the essence of creative living; the very thing D. W. Winnicott 
tells us gives meaning to life itself. 
Thus, I will show that there is even more to be said about the value of aesthetic 
education underlying Eisner’s insights regarding the arts’ capacity to develop the mind. 
As such, my goal in this chapter is to extend Eisner’s account, providing a deeper 
appreciation for aesthetic experience itself by drawing out the developmental 
foundation upon which such experience not only relies, but continues to function in the 
present day. I will establish that meaning making is fundamentally an act of self-in-
relation-to-world and is therefore, first and foremost, an act of self and, secondarily, a 
doing of mind. It is fitting that the path for making this case lies directly in line with the 
trajectory Eisner follows; however, I will be taking a much deeper look at the process of 
differentiation by considering contributions from psychoanalytic theory in order to 
appreciate the immense significance this process entails in our early lives at the time of 
differentiation and beyond. In this exploration, the psychoanalytic perspective emerges 
as having a great deal to offer in describing the richness of meaning making itself in 
addition to addressing the environmental conditions that support the process of 
meaning making. Furthermore, the psychoanalytic perspective strengthens our 
understanding of the critical role aesthetics plays within education through providing a 
fuller account of the developmental foundation of all aesthetic phenomena and its 
connection to the process of differentiation and meaning making.  
The Need for a Deeper Look at Differentiation 
Like John Dewey’s approach, Eisner’s argument is grounded in the fact that, at 
base, we are organisms inextricable from an environment. He begins with the assertion 
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that we are biologically designed to be sensitive to the qualities of our environment, but 
the activation of our sensory system requires that we meet a properly supportive 
environment in order for this capacity to come to fruition: 
The actualization of capacity, that is, its transformation from capacity to ability, 
depends on both what the individual brings to the environment and what the 
environment brings to the individual. During the course of human development 
there are certain critical periods during which stimulation and nurture of sensory 
capacities are crucial.7  
 
We can see this idea reflected in Eisner’s account of differentiation. Put simply, to 
differentiate means to distinguish, to make or render different,8 and Eisner’s account 
focuses on sensory differentiation, a significant process in which children learn to make 
distinctions based on the various sensory qualities they experience within their 
environment. As he explains, some objects in our environment are large or loud whereas 
other objects are smooth or sweet. We respond to these distinctions, recall them in 
memory, and even manipulate them in imagination. Furthermore, as we gain more 
experience with the world, we become more sophisticated in our capacity to 
differentiate. In this vein, Eisner says, “as children mature, their ability to experience 
qualities in the environment becomes increasingly differentiated.”9 He tells us that it is 
exploration that leads to the construction of distinctions among the qualities 
encountered in the environment. This account suggests that as long as a child’s sensory 
capacities are intact and he or she meets an environment sufficiently rich in qualitative 
differences, the child will develop the capacity to distinguish among qualities within the 
environment. 
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While this account essentially holds true, I would like to deepen the discussion 
by taking seriously the idea that the distinctions discerned from the environment are in 
service of a self-in-relation-to-world and are not discerned simply for their own sake. 
Accordingly, Dewey asserts that “the dictionary will inform anyone who consults it that 
early use of words like sweet and bitter was not to denote qualities of sense as such but 
to discriminate things as favorable and hostile” — that is, as favorable or hostile to a self-
in-relation-to-world.10 Thus, I maintain that the ability to make such distinctions rests on 
a more fundamental psychological capacity of self-in-relation-to-world and that the 
further refinement of sensory differentiation that Eisner addresses is secondary to this 
fundamental development. This is important to recognize because even if the conditions 
Eisner details do provide a child with the ability to notice and respond to the 
distinctions in texture, size, shape, smell, and sound that the environment provides, this 
is not to say that these distinctions would necessarily be meaningful — that is, related to 
self and world. Hence, I contend that in order for the information discerned from the 
environment to be meaningful, we need to account for more than simply sensory 
detection of qualitative differences. As such, the process of sensory differentiation that 
Eisner describes emerges as a secondary development that relies on a more fundamental 
process of psychological differentiation.  
In order to demonstrate how this idea extends and deepens Eisner’s account, I 
turn to an example he uses to illustrate the trajectory that connects the development of a 
four-week-old infant to that of a forty-year-old:  
The extent to which sensory systems can be used to distinguish among those 
qualities to which they are biologically sensitive depends in part on the 
organism’s prior experience and developmental history. For example, the four-
week-old infant must learn how to focus and how to track moving objects, but so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 John Dewey, Art as Experience (1934; repr. New York: Perigee, 2005), 15. 
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must the forty-year-old adult who is first learning how to hunt. While the adult 
has all of the physiological prerequisites, other necessary conditions — prior 
hunting experience, for example — may be missing. As for the infant, both the 
physiological and the experiential conditions that are lacking will soon be 
gained, for, at about the age of four months, both the ability to focus and to track 
are well-developed skills in the normal child.11 
 
Stated differently, the eye movement of the four-week-old infant eventually leads the 
child to be able to track and focus reliably at four months of age. Continuing the 
example, Eisner links the physiological achievements acquired in infancy to the activity 
of the now forty-year-old who is hunting for the first time. While this adult may indeed 
lack the experiential prerequisite of prior hunting experience needed to effectively 
demonstrate the skills of visual differentiation required in hunting, she is drawing from 
the advanced physiological abilities she has acquired since the time of infancy in 
addition to a plethora of other experiences with the world in which she has refined her 
capacity to visually differentiate. Thus, the ability to differentiate requires both 
physiological and experiential achievements, and we build on what has been acquired in 
the past as we continually refine our capacity to differentiate. 
In this account it seems that Eisner is placing the tracking and focusing activity of 
the infant within the same line of developmental continuity as the tracking and focusing 
activity in relation to hunting. However, I do not believe that such an analysis goes far 
enough to address the vast differences between the two cases. At one level we can see 
that although the hunter is “reading” the landscape with naïve eyes, she is drawing on 
an already firmly established ability to discern the stones from the field, whereas the 
activity of the neonate is qualitatively different. Indeed, at this point in development, the 
eye movement of the four-week-old is essentially a matter of physical stimulus and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Elliot Eisner, Cognition and Curriculum Reconsidered, 2nd ed. (New York: Teachers College Press, 1994), 24. 
In this quotation, Eisner is drawing on Burton Leonard White, Human Infants: Experience and Psychological 
Development (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971).  
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response, as she is only beginning to perceive the most basic distinctions within the 
visual array.  
 But there is an even more fundamental difference between the two cases. The 
eye movement of the forty-year-old hunter is imbued with meaning derived from 
interaction with an external, shared reality that has social significance, and this is not at 
all the case for the neonate. Where Eisner presents a continuum, I see a more radical 
break. Within the scope Eisner provides in this example, the two cases strike me as being 
fundamentally different, although I will refine my position on this point later in the 
chapter. Hence, in addition to consideration of sensory differentiation, we must also take 
into account the development of the psychological capacity to experience the world as 
external and separate from — but related to — the self. Indeed, in order for qualitative 
distinctions in the environment to be meaningful, we must first develop the more 
fundamental psychological capacity to distinguish what is “me” from what is “not me.” 
Accordingly, in addition to the account Eisner provides regarding the 
development of our sensory capacity to differentiate qualities within our environment, I 
suggest we look more deeply into the psychological capacity to distinguish what is “me” 
from what is “not me” in order to gain a richer understanding of the process of 
differentiation. In doing so, I will be relying on the psychoanalytic use of the term 
“differentiation.” Although different from Eisner’s usage, the link between Eisner’s 
discussion of sensory differentiation and the psychological differentiation I wish to 
explore is stronger than mere terminology. Indeed, I maintain that Eisner’s usage of the 
term is a direct extension of the process described within psychoanalytic theory. Thus, 
one difficulty with using the term “differentiation” in reference to the visual fields of 
both hunter and neonate is that they are not only differentiating between the various 
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objects held in relationship within the visual field, they are also distinguishing what is 
“me” and “not me.” In this, there might indeed be a radical break between the activities 
of the neonate and the hunter. 
Extending Eisner’s Account 
Ultimately, the reason I believe it is important to recognize the difference 
psychological differentiation makes is because of the crucial insight it provides for 
understanding the realms of culture, play, and aesthetic experience. In short, 
psychological differentiation, the process that develops the capacity for a relation 
between self and world, establishes a space in between the two that Winnicott termed 
transitional phenomena. In the next section I will engage in a much more detailed 
description of Winnicott’s transitional phenomena in order to show the deep 
significance of what is at stake in this developmental unfolding; however, before doing 
so, I want to take a closer look at Eisner’s work in order to draw attention to the points at 
which the concept of transitional phenomena stands to productively extend Eisner’s 
account. 
My basic claim is that underlying the acts of representation central to Eisner’s 
account of mind resides a capacity of self upon which these acts necessarily rely in order 
to be meaningful — that is, related to a self and world. Significantly, this capacity 
involves the ability to experience the space in between self and world. This in-between 
space is essentially an experiential realm of play that both separates and connects what 
is inside and outside of the self. Winnicott maintains that transitional phenomena are the 
foundation of meaning making. And if we take this idea seriously, the acts of 
representation that Eisner addresses necessarily invoke transitional phenomena. This is 
a crucial insight for appreciating the full richness of the acts of representation that Eisner 
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details, but, going even further, this enables us to see that play and aesthetic experience 
are at the very core of meaning making.  
Eisner describes four cognitive processes that are used in acts of representation, 
and I maintain that if we attend closely enough to these processes, we will begin to hear 
the reverberations of transitional phenomena residing within each of them. The first 
cognitive process Eisner addresses is inscribing, in which an idea or image is made more 
durable through manifestation in some kind of material form. This stabilizes the idea or 
image, but it is “never, to be sure, in the exact form in which it was originally 
experienced.”12 For my purposes, this process is of the utmost significance, as it 
epitomizes self-in-relation-to-world and I read the next two processes Eisner addresses 
to be derivative of this fundamental act of meaning making. The second cognitive 
process Eisner discusses, editing, is a precise process of “making the work, work” 
through “paying attention to relationships and attending to details.”13 Communication is 
the third cognitive process Eisner describes, and it is this process that, in my view, 
provides the major thrust behind Eisner’s work taken as a whole. Communication 
entails “the transformation of consciousness into a public form,”14 and this is something 
that Eisner feels is taken for granted too much of the time. Eisner asks, “‘How does 
speech, or an imagined image, or a melody we hear in our head get communicated? 
What must the ‘reader’ do for it to make sense, that is, to be meaningful?’”15 Eisner 
contends that the role of education is to facilitate these acts of mind through enabling 
access to forms of representation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Eisner, Arts and the Creation of Mind, 6.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 7.	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It is the fourth cognitive process Eisner identifies that most overtly touches upon 
Winnicott’s discussion of play. Significantly, “for Winnicott the opposite of play is not 
work but coercion.”16 Drawing on this experiential realm of play, Eisner cites “the 
discovery of ends in process, which in turn generates surprise,”17 as the fourth cognitive 
process. Eisner describes the emergence of new possibilities that present themselves in 
the course of working and the surprise that this engenders. I am reminded of the hours I 
spent in practice rooms as a music student going over the same scales or études again 
and again, only to suddenly hear an old, familiar passage in a new way. Perhaps this 
was through a new point of emphasis in a phrase or hearing a scale as a whole unit 
rather than a series of notes in a technical passage. This moment of surprise is indicative 
of the paradox — and the acceptance of the paradox — that Winnicott maintains is 
central in transitional phenomena — specifically, that what is created is also discovered. 
And Eisner, too, recognizes this paradox: “Put succinctly, surprise, a fundamental 
reward of all creative work, is bestowed by the work on its maker.”18  
Within the context of Eisner’s discussion, I believe that the need for consideration 
of the broader realm of the self becomes most apparent through the fourth cognitive 
process, as it is not a matter of skill or knowledge that engenders the discovery of ends 
in process, but rather rich engagement within experience that is made possible by 
utilizing our capacity to experience transitional phenomena. This lines up well with 
Winnicott’s approach, in which “for both patient and analyst playing replaced knowing 
as the aim and the means of analysis. The mother, and her later counterpart, the analyst, 
could enable but should not, in Winnicott’s view, inform or teach.”19 I believe that if we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Adam Phillips, Winnicott (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988), 142.  
17 Eisner, Arts and the Creation of Mind, 7.  
18 Ibid.	  
19 Phillips, Winnicott, 143.  
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took this idea more seriously in education, this fourth cognitive process, in particular, 
would be more fully supported. Eisner elaborates on this fourth cognitive process 
elegantly in saying, “Opportunities in the process of working are encountered that were 
not envisioned when the work began, but that speak so eloquently about the promise of 
emerging possibilities that new options are pursued.”20 
It is important that we do not overlook that fact that the capacity to use the third 
area of living, transitional phenomena, is essential in order for this — and, indeed, for all 
four of the cognitive processes Eisner addresses — to come to fruition. In order to fully 
appreciate this, I maintain that we need to step back from a focus on mental doings and 
consider the broader role of the self. While the field of education as a whole has done a 
lot to address the realm of mental doings, considerations of this broader realm are less 
common; this is problematic if we aspire to facilitate these four cognitive processes.  
Thus, this perspective reveals that there is much more at play than we typically 
account for in discussions of education. Going further, the broader dimension of the self-
in-relation-to-world is important for the field of education to recognize because in 
facilitating these four cognitive processes, education must draw on its foundation. And 
the expansion of this foundation within education relies on a properly supportive 
environment in order to enable such unfoldings. As such, when Winnicott refers to the 
hampering of the ability to use transitional phenomena by ongoing environmental 
factors that stifle the creative process, there is great value for education in understanding 
the conditions that hinder as well as support this unfolding. Thus, a key question for an 
education that aspires to facilitate acts of representation and the creativity inherent 
therein is this: What are the environmental conditions that support the emergence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Eisner, Arts and the Creation of Mind, 7.	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these four cognitive processes? On this point, the psychoanalytic perspective has much 
to offer.  
D. W. Winnicott, Differentiation, and Transitional Phenomena 
In using the term “differentiation” to refer to the psychological capacity to 
distinguish what is “me” from what is “not me,” I am drawing on the psychoanalytic 
meaning of the term. Essentially, the psychoanalytic notion of differentiation refers to 
the process babies and young children go through in separating from the mother and 
developing their own sense of self. Taking into account the fact that we were all literally 
one with the mother in-utero, psychoanalytic theory upholds that psychological 
separation with the mother does not occur at birth when physical separation occurs. 
Thus, according to Winnicott, “Psychologically, the infant takes from a breast that is part 
of the infant, and the mother gives milk to an infant that is part of herself.”21 If, for my 
purposes here, we extend this idea to Eisner’s example of the four-week-old infant, since 
visual stimuli at this very early stage in development is just another component of the 
all-encompassing experience of oneness and merger with the mother (and, by extension, 
the world), so too is the mother the beholder of the meaning of the visual terrain. D. W. 
Winnicott expressed this idea poignantly when, in the middle of a seminar in 1942, he 
exclaimed, “There’s no such thing as a baby! … [I]f you show me a baby you certainly 
show me also someone caring for the baby.”22 Hence, in the beginning, the entire unit of 
the baby is comprised in the environment–individual setup, or the nursing couple. The 
process through which the baby emerges as a unit and comes to distinguish “me” from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 D. W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality (1971; repr. London: Routledge, 2008), 16. 
22 D. W. Winnicott, “Anxiety Associated with Insecurity” (1952), cited in Jan Abram, The Language of 
Winnicott: A Dictionary and Guide to Understanding His Work (Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson, 1996), 
2–3. Abram’s book is a comprehensive anthology of Winnicott’s work. She compiles extensive excerpts from 
his writings, papers, and other archival materials, organizing these according to the concepts central to his 
theories. She includes a complete bibliography of Winnicott’s work, and many of the Winnicott quotations I 
use in this chapter come from this source. 
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“not me” is the process of differentiation at its most fundamental level. From this 
perspective, we can see that the process of differentiation is primarily about the 
development of self-in-relation-to-world, and that the development of sensory capacities 
and the perception of qualitative differences in the environment that Eisner emphasizes 
is a secondary matter that builds on this foundation.  
Before jumping further into a discussion of differentiation from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that there is no direct or 
definitive way of knowing infantile experience. For that matter, I acknowledge that I 
have no way of knowing what the four-week-old infant in Eisner’s example is 
experiencing or what the tracking and focusing activity she is developing means to her. 
Nevertheless, Winnicott’s discussion about the process of differentiation makes sense to 
me on a number of levels, and I find it to be persuasive. Additionally, I consider the fact 
that Winnicott had a great deal of clinical experience working with mothers and infants 
to be encouraging (although admittedly not conclusive).23 Thus, I ultimately leave it to 
the reader to determine for him- or herself the merits of Winnicott’s account, but ask for 
the temporary suspension of any disbelief in order to allow Winnicott’s account to 
emerge and potentially resonate. 
The Process of Differentiation 
The process of differentiation involves a complex interaction between the baby 
and the mothering environment (which is not limited to the mother alone, and need not 
involve the biological mother at all). Broadly, there are two main phases to the process 
of differentiation: illusionment and disillusionment. The first phase involves an intense 
period following birth in which the mother goes into a state of preoccupation with her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Indeed, Winnicott was a pediatrician before he became a psychoanalyst and therefore, there is a rich 
experiential basis underlying his theoretical account. 
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baby so extreme that Winnicott likens it to an illness. Indeed, it is a state of supreme 
psychological merger that supplies the necessary conditions for a basic sense of security 
and trust to be formed, enabling the next phase to be meaningful. Facilitated by the 
mother’s gradual “recovery” from this illness, the second phase begins when the mother 
remembers that she is a separate person, and, in doing so, she aids her baby in realizing 
the same thing.  
At the start, by adapting almost perfectly to her baby’s needs, the mother 
supports an illusion of the baby’s omnipotence — in other words, from the baby’s 
perspective, it is he that creates the world around him:24 
The breast is created by the infant over and over again out of the infant’s capacity 
to love or (one can say) out of need. A subjective phenomenon develops in the 
baby, which we call the mother’s breast. The mother places the actual breast just 
there where the infant is ready to create, and at the right moment.25  
 
It is the mother’s supreme identification with her baby that allows for this necessary 
illusion. Furthermore, this extraordinary task performed by what Winnicott termed the 
“ordinary devoted mother” lays a foundation of being: 
The important thing is that I am means nothing unless I at the beginning am along 
with another human being who has not yet been differentiated off. For this reason it 
is more true to talk about being than to use the words I am, which belong to the 
next stage. It cannot be overemphasized that being is the beginning of 
everything, without which doing and being done have no significance.26 
 
Winnicott tells us that supreme merger with the mothering environment at the 
beginning of life provides the necessary foundation for a life lived creatively: “Creativity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 My use of “he” in reference to the baby and throughout this recurrent example is intended to clarify the 
positions of mother (she) and baby (he). It should be understood that my use of “he” or “she” is intended to 
provide clarity of position and is not intended to stipulate gender. The “mother” in my discussion could 
very well be a man and the baby could certainly be male or female.  
25 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 15.  
26 D. W. Winnicott, “The Ordinary Devoted Mother” (1966), cited in Abram The Language of Winnicott, 68.  
	   34 
is the doing that arises out of being.”27 Thus, the experience of omnipotence a mother 
affords her baby at the beginning is retained throughout life in the form of creative 
impulse — an impulse that is not a special endowment for the artist alone, but is 
“something that is present when anyone … looks in a healthy way at anything or does 
anything deliberately.”28 Indeed, we are born in a state of merger with the environment, 
and we depend on the environment to provide the support necessary at the beginning in 
order to meaningfully start to separate out in the next phase of differentiation. 
Disillusionment is a gradual and precarious process in which the mother and 
baby separate from each other, enabling the realization of a world that is separate from 
— but related to — a self. While disillusionment is only possible if the illusion of 
omnipotence has been sufficiently supported at the start, it is the process of 
disillusionment that ultimately separates out what is “me” from what is “not me.” 
Furthermore, Eisner’s conception of mind begins to emerge through the process of 
disillusionment, but so too does the self — which is broader than Eisner’s conception of 
mind, as it encompasses independent initiative and purpose in addition to the doings of 
mind. 
Through lessening her degree of adaptation in a way that meets her baby’s 
growing ability to contend with frustration, a mother disillusions her baby. The baby 
will have to wait a little longer to be fed, for example, and through such small but 
manageable “failures” on the part of the mother, she allows for her baby to discover 
himself. Indeed, the creative gesture that emerges out of frustration in the form of a cry 
or protest brings forth the moment that the baby can start to discover himself as a 
separate being from the mother: “By ‘failing’ in this way, the mother unknowingly, 	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28 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 92.	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allows the infant to feel and experience his needs. This ‘failure’ contributes to his 
developing sense of self.”29 At the same time, the baby is discovering the actual world 
that is, of course, not really under his omnipotent control. In this way, the process of 
learning the world and learning the self form two sides of the same coin of 
differentiation. 
Precarious is perhaps one of the best words to describe the process of 
disillusionment because it must be fine-tuned to meet the baby’s growing 
developmental needs, which are constantly shifting. “If the external opposition is too 
intrusive, the baby can only react, rather than respond. Reacting to impingements, in 
Winnicott’s terminology, means that the infant’s sense of self and continuity-of-being is 
interrupted.… This is what constitutes a violation of self.”30 The opposite extreme of 
impingement is the mother who clings to her infant and in remaining merged never 
allows the baby to separate out what is “me” from what is “not me.” Moreover, as the 
baby develops, there is a constant vacillation of needs: 
We see therefore that in infancy and in management of infants there is a very 
subtle distinction between the mother’s understanding of her infant’s need based 
on empathy, and her change over to an understanding based on something in the 
infant or small child that indicates need. This is particularly difficult for mothers 
because of the fact that children vacillate between one state and the other; one 
minute they are merged with their mothers, and require empathy, while the next 
they are separated from her, and then if she knows their needs in advance she is 
dangerous, a witch.31  
 
However, through providing the appropriate support at the appropriate time, 
the mother is gradually relieved of her adaptive function, as “the infant’s mind and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Abram, The Language of Winnicott, 130.  
30 Ibid., 19.  
31 D. W. Winnicott, “Theory of Parent-Infant Relationship” (1960), cited in Abram The Language of Winnicott, 
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infant’s intellectual processes [become] able to account for and so to allow for failures of 
adaptation.”32 Winnicott provides an example of the moment such intelligence emerges: 
Think of an infant expecting a feed. The time comes when the infant can wait a 
few minutes because noises in the kitchen indicate that food is about to appear. 
Instead of simply being excited by the noises, the infant uses the news item in 
order to be able to wait.33 
 
This marks a significant point in a baby’s development and also marks the point at 
which Eisner’s notion of mind enters into Winnicott’s discussion of differentiation. 
In forming the concept of the arrival of food derived from information picked up 
through the senses, the baby in Winnicott’s example is enacting the initial aspects of 
mind that Eisner describes, that is, sensory differentiation and concept formation. Eisner 
tells us, “The formulation of concepts is, in a sense, a data-reduction process of distilling 
the essential features of an array of qualities so that they stand for a larger class of 
phenomena.”34 In the case of the baby in Winnicott’s example, this involves reducing 
sensory data from the noises the baby hears into essential features that have come to 
stand for the arrival of food. However, connecting Winnicott’s example to his theory of 
differentiation tells us that there is much more going on than Eisner’s account addresses. 
First, the baby is becoming aware of his need, which is separate from the environment. 
Thus, the baby is learning both self and world. Second, the baby is learning to tolerate 
the frustration of not having his need met because he has an idea — a symbol — of food 
arriving soon. This symbol is not just mental activity that formed a concept disconnected 
from purpose and intention, but is rather something that he (the baby) can make use of, 
putting self and world in relation to one another. And, third, this symbol provides a 	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Winnicott, 132.  
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connection between the baby and food, which is ultimately a symbol of connection with 
mother. Thus, in a healthy way the baby is warding off separation because he is filling in 
the potential space between himself and mother with his own creative act of concept 
formation. This last aspect is exactly in line with Winnicott’s transitional phenomena. 
While Eisner’s discussion of differentiation and mind accounts for aspects of the 
world in relation to sensory perception and mental activity, Winnicott’s scope is 
broader, encompassing the self as a whole in relation to the world. This difference in 
scope is likely reflective of the fact that Eisner focuses on school-age children, whereas 
Winnicott’s focus is on infancy. I believe that Winnicott’s emphasis on the foundational 
aspects of human development enriches Eisner’s discussion by providing an 
appreciation of the immense role that the process of differentiation continues to play 
throughout life. To show how this is the case, I will now turn directly to a discussion of 
Winnicott’s notion of transitional phenomena. 
Transitional Phenomena 
The concept of transitional phenomena is critical for my purposes not only 
because it is pivotal to the process of differentiation occurring in infancy and early 
childhood, but more significantly because it provides a conceptual framework for 
understanding a realm of experience that occurs throughout life which offers particular 
insight into the arts. Abram describes transitional phenomena well in observing, “the 
concept of transitional phenomena refers to a dimension of living that belongs neither to 
internal nor to external reality; rather, it is the place that both connects and separates 
inner and outer.”35 This experiential realm fits well within Dewey’s conception of 
aesthetic experience and thus serves to deepen Eisner’s account on multiple levels. In 
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addition to deepening Eisner’s discussion of differentiation, the concept of transitional 
phenomena remains a strong counterpart throughout Eisner’s discussion of the arts. 
Although we experience transitional phenomena throughout life, at base this 
concept is linked to the process of differentiation occurring in infancy and early 
childhood. It is epitomized in a baby’s first object — a soft doll or toy, the corner of a 
blanket, or even a baby’s own hand or fist. This is the object that first transitions from 
being “me” to “not me,” making it possible for the baby to symbolize and to have a 
relationship between internal and external reality. From the baby’s perspective, this 
object is both “me” and “not me”: it is both created by the baby and discovered as an 
aspect of an already present world; it is paradoxical through and through — and it is 
vital that this paradox be accepted. 
I should like to put in a reminder here that the essential feature in the concept of 
transitional objects and phenomena (according to my presentation of the subject) 
is the paradox, and the acceptance of the paradox: the baby creates the object, but the 
object was there waiting to be created.… I tried to draw attention to this aspect of 
transitional phenomena by claiming that in the rules of the game we all know 
that we will never challenge the baby to elicit an answer to the question: did you 
create that or did you find it?36  
 
Thus, as “one of the bridges that make[s] contact possible between the individual psyche 
and external reality,”37 parents accept this paradox and allow their child to carry around 
his or her first object at all times, allowing it to get dirty because they know that washing 
it would introduce “a break in continuity in the infant’s experience, a break that may 
destroy the meaning and value of the object to the infant.”38 
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37 D. W. Winnicott, “Group Influences and the Maladjusted Child” (1955), cited in Abram, The Language of 
Winnicott, 341. 
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At the time of disillusionment, when the mother becomes gradually less 
available to her baby, this first object comes to symbolize the mother who, from the 
baby’s perspective, is not yet separate. In times of her physical absence, the baby 
psychologically holds onto her through the use of the transitional object. Over time the 
quality of the baby’s interaction with the object changes. At the start, Winnicott 
describes the interaction between the baby and the transitional object as object-relating, 
in which the object is subjectively perceived — just as the mother is a part of the baby at 
this point, so too is the first object. However, if all goes well in the process of 
disillusionment, the quality of this interaction gradually changes into what Winnicott 
termed object-usage, in which the object becomes external and separate from the baby — 
it has withstood all of the baby’s aggression as well as love and remained intact and 
separate.  
Once this occurs, the object itself is no longer needed; however, this critical object 
has enabled a new capacity within the child that is of immense importance. This 
capacity extends well beyond the use of a single object, establishing a space that can be 
filled in with creative play, the use of symbols, and with all that eventually adds up to 
cultural life.39 Indeed, Winnicott argues that in one sense, there is no actual separation 
for humans between baby and mother, child and family, individual and society or 
world. This is because we fill in the gap, which in reality does of course exist, with 
symbol and creative play: “The baby’s separating-out of the world of objects from the 
self is achieved only through the absence of a space between, the potential space being 
filled in in the way I am describing.”40 Winnicott contends that this potential space is the 
“location” in which we spend most of our time when we are experiencing life. Thus, 	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Winnicott directly links our highest cultural achievements with a child’s play at the time 
of differentiation.  
It will be observed that I am looking at the highly sophisticated adult’s 
enjoyment of living or of beauty or of abstract human contrivance, and at the 
same time at the creative gesture of a baby who reaches out for the mother’s 
mouth and feels her teeth, and at the same time looks into her eyes, seeing her 
creatively. For me, playing leads on naturally to cultural experience and indeed 
forms its foundation.41 
 
Thus, the process of differentiation not only enables the distinction between 
internal and external reality, but it enables the capacity for a third area of living: 
My claim is that if there is a need for this double statement, there is a need for a 
triple one; there is a third part of the life of a human being, a part that we cannot 
ignore, an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external 
life both contribute. It is an area which is not challenged, because no claim is 
made on its behalf except that it shall exist as a resting-place for the individual 
engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate 
yet inter-related.42 
 
Although Winnicott admits that he cannot precisely define the word “culture,” he is 
quite clear that we can only benefit from “the common pool of humanity, into which 
individuals and groups of people may contribute, and from which we may all draw if we 
have somewhere to put what we find.”43 Thus, Winnicott tells us that successfully realizing 
the process of differentiation enables the capacity for play, culture, creativity, art, 
religion, not to mention the feeling that life itself is worth living.  
This perspective reveals that differentiation entails a great deal more than 
sensory capacity alone and provides much more detail regarding the considerable 
difference between the eye movement of the four-week-old and that of the forty-year-
old in Eisner’s example. However, at this point, I find myself in a position to back off a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid., 143.	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43 D. W. Winnicott, “Location of Cultural Experience” (1967), cited in Abram The Language of Winnicott, 110.  
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bit from a claim that I made previously regarding the difference between the two cases. 
Previously, I referred to the two cases Eisner presents as being fundamentally different 
and noted that I envision a more radical break where Eisner describes a continuum. 
However, now that we have arrived at a level of much greater specificity regarding the 
process of differentiation, I am in a position to refine this statement a bit. The 
fundamental difference I was referring to pertains to the establishment of a self that is 
separate from the world while still being related to it. However, Winnicott’s detailed 
account of the process by which this achievement occurs reveals that psychological 
differentiation, too, occurs along a continuum. Thus, the degree of difference between 
the two cases depends on the precision of the lens through which we are looking.  
The Extreme End of the Continuum of Differentiation 
Continuing this discussion of Winnicott’s theory, I will next address Winnicott’s 
account of the extreme end of the continuum of differentiation — specifically, his 
discussion of psychosis. This is one of the more controversial aspects of Winnicott’s 
theory, and I would like to clarify that, for my purposes here, it is not important whether 
Winnicott is right about psychosis itself, as my interest in psychosis is theoretical rather 
than clinical. As a manifestation of a self that is not firmly established as separate but 
related to the world, the case of psychosis provides a way to understand the extreme 
end of the continuum of differentiation. And this affords a great deal of insight into how 
the process of differentiation — in its full range of manifestations — plays out in human 
life, especially as it relates to aesthetic phenomena. 
Winnicott viewed psychosis essentially as an “environmental deficiency 
disease,” ascribing its etiology to very early environmental failures that disrupt the 
process of differentiation: “I admit that some infants are more difficult to nurture than 
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others, but as we are not out to blame anyone, we can ascribe the cause of illness here to 
a failure in nurture.”44 Indeed, this is an extreme view of the etiology of psychosis, and it 
is common today to consider environmental conditions as only one of several potential 
contributing factors to the occurrence of psychotic illness. Accordingly, the fourth 
edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders states, “Although much evidence suggests the importance of genetic 
factors in the etiology of Schizophrenia [one of the major psychotic illnesses], the 
existence of a substantial discordance rate in monozygotic twins also indicates the 
importance of environmental factors.”45 Notably, this statement is not included in the 
most recent edition, the DSM-5.46 As my purpose is not to determine the cause of 
psychosis, I maintain that Winnicott’s view on this matter is germane to this discussion 
despite any controversy about his claim. 
As a psychoanalyst, Winnicott was deeply aware of the vital role the capacity for 
transitional phenomena plays in human life. In enabling a “person’s inner world [to be] 
related to the outer or actual world and yet … personal and capable of an aliveness of its 
own,” the process of differentiation, when successful, makes it possible to live 
meaningfully and creatively.47 I believe that for Winnicott, the meaning of life resides in 
creative living. While this is something we all struggle with at times, Winnicott tells us 
that the more extreme struggles of psychotic patients provide a way for us to 
understand what human life is all about: 
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[W]hat is life about? You may cure your patient and not know what it is that 
makes him or her go on living. It is of the first importance for us to acknowledge 
openly that absence of psychoneurotic illness may be health, but it is not life. 
Psychotic patients who are all the time hovering between living and not living 
force us to look at this problem, one that really belongs not to psychoneurotics but 
to all human beings. I am claiming that these same phenomena that are life and 
death to our schizoid or borderline patients appear in our cultural experiences. It 
is these cultural experiences that provide the continuity in the human race that 
transcends the personal existence. I am assuming that cultural experiences are in 
direct continuity with play, the play of those who have not yet heard of games.48  
 
This portrayal opens the discussion of differentiation even further, as the case of 
psychotic illness provides a counterpart to a citation Eisner includes in his discussion of 
sensory differentiation pertaining to some famous research on kittens.49 This research 
showed that “kittens whose eyes have been occluded during the first few months of life 
lose their capacity to see when the occlusions are removed.”50 Thus, just as there are 
necessary environmental contributions in the development of sensory capacities, 
Winnicott’s claim about the actualization of the psychological capacity to differentiate is 
in line with Eisner’s assertion that “the actualization of a capacity … depends on both 
what the individual brings to the environment and what the environment brings to the 
individual.”51 Indeed, the case of psychotic illness gives us living proof that the capacity 
for psychological differentiation (that is, to distinguish “me” from “not me”) is not 
something that can be taken for granted. Winnicott refers to psychosis as a “failure of the 
structuring of the personal self, and the capacity of the self for relating to objects that are 
of the environment,” thus placing psychosis at the heart of the process of 
differentiation.52  	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Winnicott’s view of psychosis exemplifies the very Deweyan notion of the 
integral relationship between organism and environment, asserting that sanity and 
insanity alike are not features of isolated individuals, but rather appear in the interaction 
of individuals with their environments. Drawing on a quotation from a friend of his, 
Winnicott expresses this idea: 
“Insanity is not being able to find anyone to stand you,” and here there are two 
factors: the degree of illness in the patient and the ability of the environment to 
tolerate the symptoms. In this way there are some in the world who are more ill 
than some of those who are in mental hospitals.53 
 
From this perspective, the problem of insanity is not unrelated to the problems all of us 
face in everyday living. (Alas, according to this view, we are all insane at least some of 
the time!) Moreover, Winnicott views all mental illness as an “exaggeration of elements” 
that occur normally and notes specifically that “we do not see anything which would 
put psychiatrically ill people in a place apart.”54 This is not to dismiss the very real 
problems that psychotics and others who are psychiatrically ill face, but rather to 
understand these problems as extreme manifestations of the struggles we all encounter.  
The Aesthetic Realm 
Indeed, what is vital at the time of differentiation in infancy and childhood 
continues to be important throughout life. Just as Winnicott exclaimed in 1942 that 
“there’s no such thing as a baby” separate from the mothering environment, he 
extended this idea into adulthood in 1971: “When one speaks of a man one speaks of 
him along with the summation of his cultural experiences. The whole forms a unit.”55 
Hence, we continually draw upon our capacity to experientially fill in the potential 
space between self and world, and this is evident in the subtle and ongoing nature of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid., 109. 
54 Ibid., 105. 
55 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 133. 	  
	   45 
transitional phenomena. “The potential space varies greatly from individual to 
individual, and its foundation is the baby’s trust in the mother experienced over a long-
enough period at the critical stage of the separation of the not-me from the me, when the 
establishment of an autonomous self is at the initial stage.”56 Although in health we do 
not need the same degree of environmental support required at the time of 
differentiation because a basic trust in the environment has been established, this is no 
way denies the ongoing and pervasive nature of transitional phenomena. As Winnicott 
states, 
It is assumed here that the task of reality-acceptance is never completed, that no 
human being is ever free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and 
that relief from this strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience 
which is not challenged (arts, religion, etc.) This intermediate area is in direct 
continuity with the play area of the small child who is “lost” in play.57 
 
Thus, immersed in a cocoon of sound, a high school musician consciously awaits 
the arrival of her impending flute entrance while also allowing for a measure of 
absorption among the sounds objectively emanating from the instruments of her fellow 
musicians and her own internal world. As she prepares to play the first note of her 
entrance — a C# right above the staff, perhaps the most open and vulnerable of notes 
because it literally involves the release of all control by the fingers — she breathes in the 
sound around her and places herself within the acoustic array. She has trust that the 
ensemble around her will support her voice, which at this point is one and the same 
with her own, as she reaches back unconsciously to a time when she took initial steps 
away from her mother, on some level unaware of and therefore unthreatened by the 
distance she was physically enacting because of the support her environment provided 
that made it possible for her to fill in the gap, maintaining connection despite the void 	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incurred. It is her capacity to do so — to stay close as she steps away, to use the sounds 
around her to hold her — that makes possible fresh exploration in the world. And as an 
extender of the aesthetic realm, her teacher oversees and facilitates this expansion, 
fulfilling a function that is no doubt different, but in a meaningful way similar to that of 
her mother way back when.  
Resting at the intersection between self and world, Winnicott’s realm of 
transitional phenomena facilitates the aesthetic dimension at a core level. Thus, 
Winnicott’s deeper look at the process of differentiation opens Eisner’s discussion of 
mind and the arts considerably by including the concept of self-in-relation-to-world.58 
Beyond Eisner’s account of mind, the concept of self speaks to motivation, meaning, 
and, indeed, what makes life itself worth living. Perhaps the most significant insight that 
I take away from Winnicott is that what distinguishes living from merely existing is 
being able to creatively fill in the potential space between self and world. And on this 
point, Eisner’s account of mind reenters the picture, as his discussion of meaning and 
representation provide the mechanisms through which this is achieved. 
Meaning and Representation 
The three main terms that come into play within Eisner’s discussion of mind are 
sensation, conception, and representation.59 A fourth term, meaning, is integral to the 
workings of this conception of mind; however, I think that we need to embrace 
Winnicott’s discussion of differentiation in order to appreciate the full richness of what 
this fourth term adds. Hence, when something is considered to be meaningful, I contend 
that there is more going on than sensation, conception, and representation. Indeed, 
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discussions of meaning entail a self-in-relation-to-world and thus invoke the deeper 
notion of differentiation that Winnicott provides.  
It is clear that meaning is vital to Eisner’s overall project. Indeed, Eisner attests, 
“The ability to secure meaning in the course of our experience is a basic human need; we 
all want to lead meaningful lives. But meaning is not simply found; it is constructed.”60 
Commencing from this point, Eisner focuses on representation and the importance of 
learning how to be “multi-literate” in order have access to the full range of meanings 
made available through culture: “Literacy, as I use the term, is the ability to encode or 
decode meaning in any of the forms of representation used in the culture to convey or 
express meaning.”61 Thus, Eisner contends that one of the major aims of education is to 
develop “students’ ability to access meaning within the variety of forms of 
representation that humans use to represent the contents of their consciousness.”62 This 
lends a great deal of support to arts education and science or math education alike, as 
“each form of representation has a special contribution to make to human experience.”63 
However, I urge that we pause a moment to consider the meaning the 
construction of meaning has in terms of Winnicott’s discussion of differentiation before 
moving on to the issue of representation. Hence, prior to consideration of overt acts of 
representation, I believe it is fruitful to consider more modest acts of perception as a key 
to appreciating that the meaning and creativity implicated in such acts is, indeed, 
embedded within this less complicated scope. Winnicott tells us that a trace of the 
infantile experience of creating the world remains in all acts of perception, as “what is 
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objectively perceived is by definition to some extent subjectively conceived of.”64 Thus, 
even the act of looking and seeing is inherently creative and invokes transitional 
phenomena, filling in the space between sensory stimuli and meaning. As Adam Phillips 
surmises from a Winnicottian perspective, “Perception — looking at things — is an 
addition to, but must never be separated from, apperception — seeing oneself.”65 While 
Eisner tells us that the ability to encode and decode forms of representation makes it 
possible to derive meaning from acts of perception, Winnicott adds that such acts 
emanate from a self and that there is an essential component of creativity invested in 
these acts: 
The creativity that we are studying belongs to the approach of the individual to 
external reality. Assuming reasonable brain capacity, enough intelligence to 
enable the individual to become a person living and taking part in the life of 
community, everything that happens is creative except in so far as the individual 
is ill, or is hampered by ongoing environmental factors which stifle his creative 
process.66 
 
Hence, to the extent that we are healthy in this way, every deliberate act is creative and 
implicates the self — and were this not the case, it would not be possible to derive 
meaning from such acts. Whenever meaning is constructed, there is always a self-in-
relation-to-world, and it is fruitful to take this into consideration as a prerequisite to 
Eisner’s discussion of representation. While Eisner has a great deal to tell us about the 
importance of providing students access to multiple forms of representation, I want to 
add that in doing so we are expanding on a foundation of self-in-relation-to-world and, 
thus, are allowing for an educational unfolding that is much deeper than we typically 
recognize. 
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Beyond being compatible with one another, the accounts of Winnicott and Eisner 
have a certain degree of overlap, as they both argue in support of the other’s basic 
position to some extent. Winnicott was deeply concerned about enabling the 
individual’s capacity for play and creativity to come to fruition. While his core focus was 
on the environmental conditions that support the capacity to experience transitional 
phenomena through the process of differentiation, he also recognized the critical need 
for individuals to be introduced to cultural elements at the appropriate point in their 
development so that they could exercise this capacity. Indeed, Winnicott identifies two 
needs that must be met in order for an individual’s capacity for play to come to fruition. 
The first involves the proper environmental conditions that support the process of 
differentiation, and the second is directly on point with Eisner’s approach: “The second 
need is for those who have care of children of all ages to be ready to put each child into 
touch with appropriate elements of the cultural heritage, according to the individual 
child’s capacity and emotional age and developmental phase.”67 Eisner follows up on 
this point well in saying, “Without the ability to ‘read’ the special and unique meanings 
that different forms of representation make possible, their content will remain … an 
untappable resource, an enigma that they cannot solve.”68 
And, indeed, there are a number of ways that Eisner makes points that speak to 
the foundation Winnicott provided in his notion of transitional phenomena and the role 
it plays in human life. In addition to mental doings, I believe Eisner is fundamentally 
concerned with what life is all about, and I think that he shares in Winnicott’s vision that 
it is cultural experience and the creation of meaning that makes life worth living. Eisner 
tells us that “work in the arts is not only a way of creating performances and products; it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Ibid., 148. 	  
68 Eisner, Cognition and Curriculum Reconsidered, 19. 
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is a way of creating our lives by expanding our consciousness, shaping our dispositions, 
satisfying our quest for meaning, establishing contact with others, and sharing a 
culture.”69 Hence, although the major thrust behind Eisner’s argument rests in the 
mental doings of sensation, conception, and representation, there is a broader picture to 
which he is speaking and, indeed, a broader picture to consider in all discussions of 
aesthetic phenomena. Furthermore, this broader picture emerges through the process of 
differentiation; thus, while the arts do indeed contribute to the creation of mind, they are 
more fundamentally an act of self-in-relation-to-world. 
Coda 
At a fundamental level, all representations are concrete manifestations of 
interactions between self and world. Representations are embodied in material and 
made meaningful through the use of culture. Indeed, Winnicott tells us that it is culture 
that continues to hold us beyond the time of differentiation, extending the mothering 
environment through the use of transitional phenomena. Thus, culture — and this 
includes the forms of representation that Eisner concentrates on — is meaningful 
because culture provides the material and nonmaterial substance that we use to 
creatively fill in the potential space between self and world. Eisner describes the 
mechanisms through which this is achieved (that is, forms of representation), and 
Winnicott describes the meaning of it.  
This discussion establishes that what constitutes meaningful experience is a self-
in-relation-to-world and that the process through which this developmental 
achievement is realized has fundamental significance that persists throughout life in the 
form of aesthetic experience. This insight has bearing on the conception of aesthetic 
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education itself, as it connects the doings of representation to a capacity for creativity 
and selfhood that is laid down in early life. Accordingly, through this analysis we see 
the emergence of a view of aesthetic education as an extension of the process of 
psychological differentiation. This deeper view of aesthetic education affords the insight 
that in addition to enabling students to have access to multiple forms of representation 
through which meaning is made, doing so generates the conditions for the continual 
refinement of self-in-relation-to-world. In this, aesthetic education touches the very core 
of our being and enacts the continual deepening and refinement of a process that 
provides meaning to life itself.
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CHAPTER THREE 
DEWEY’S “PECULIAR” MODE OF HUMAN ASSOCIATION: 
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND MEANING 
John Dewey’s philosophy poses an intriguing connection between aesthetic 
experience and meaning. Indeed, the bond between the two is clearly established within 
Dewey’s writing, but its significance has been left largely untilled. Thus, my aim in this 
chapter is to disclose and deepen the vital link between aesthetic experience and 
meaning within Dewey’s philosophy—and beyond. I begin my analysis by focusing on 
Dewey’s discussion of meaning and explore the “peculiar” mode of human association 
that gives rise to intelligence and meaning: the establishment of partners. In doing so, I 
deepen Dewey’s discussion by turning to the psychoanalytic theory of D.W. Winnicott, 
whose developmental perspective fills out significant aspects of Dewey’s account. 
Winnicott remains a vital counterpart throughout my discussion, as his insights carry 
over from the development of meaning to aesthetic experience in detailing how 
immediate sensation becomes transformed into meaning. Crucially, I submit that a 
quality of the relationship that facilitates this profound transformation persists in all 
subsequent meaningful relations between self and world and that we can see this quality 
reflected most intensely within aesthetic experience. In this, the connection between 
aesthetic experience and meaning surfaces, uncovering a fundamental link between the 
two that resides at our core as meaning making creatures. Hence, I submit aesthetic 
experience as meaning. 
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A valuable insight in its own right, realizing this union proves significant for 
education in particular, as aesthetic experience moves to the core of all meaning making 
pursuits and the quality of relation that bonds them becomes fundamental to learning 
itself. Moreover, the significance for education is deepened further through considering 
a developmental perspective. Indeed, where Dewey’s analysis describes a quality of 
relation, psychoanalytic theory provides a systematic approach that speaks to the 
development of the capacity for this type of relation to occur. Furthermore, as 
psychoanalysis is primarily concerned with providing therapeutic support, it is chiefly 
focused on cultivating the conditions that enable this type of relation to come to fruition; 
thus filling a significant educational gap within Dewey’s account.  
Dewey’s Discussion of Meaning 
What is key for my purposes is that both Dewey’s aesthetic theory and theory of 
meaning rely on a relational quality between self and world—a relational quality that I 
believe originates in a developmental unfolding that connects the two on a fundamental 
level. To show how this is case, I begin my analysis in consideration of Dewey’s 
discussion of meaning. For Dewey, meaning emerges through use and thus necessarily 
involves a relationship between self and world because in order to make use of objects in 
the world they must first be related to us through our intents and purposes. Although 
this can be difficult to understand in the abstract, the case of communication provides a 
concrete manifestation of this necessary relationship. Hence, another way of looking at 
this is to say that on an essential level, meaning can be understood in terms of “two 
selves involved in a conjoint or shared undertaking.”1 While it may not always be the 
case that there are literally two selves involved in every instance of meaning making, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Dewey, Experience and Nature Second Edition (New York: Dover Publication, Inc., 1958), 299.	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uphold that this statement nevertheless essentially holds true in terms of the quality of 
relation (if not a literal relationship between two selves) that is necessary for 
engendering meaning. In order to show how this is the case, I turn to Dewey’s theory 
and the necessary establishment of partners in a situation. 
The Establishment of Partners 
Although meaning encompasses a broader scope than instances of literal 
communication between two selves, the case of communication provides a context in 
which meaning clearly and necessarily resides. As such, communication provides a 
good place to start in teasing apart the significance of Dewey’s account of meaning. 
Dewey tells us that the essence and import of communication, signs, and meaning is that 
“Something is literally made common in at least two different centres of behavior.”2 
Whereas the mechanical routine exhibited in the “speech” of a parrot may prove 
meaningful to a hearer, the occurrence itself cannot be considered a full act of 
communication, as it lacks the alliance that is necessary in genuine acts of 
communication and language.3 Thus, Dewey says, “While signaling acts are a material 
condition of language they are not language nor yet are they its sufficient condition;” 
namely, “the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners.”4  
It is important to recognize that the establishment of this partnership in activity 
is something unique that characterizes human association. Hence, what Dewey refers to 
as the “peculiar” form of interaction that characterizes human association is the context 
that establishes this necessary partnership in activity, of which “intelligence and 
meaning are the natural consequences.”5 It is significant that human beings are born into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ibid., 178.	  
3 See Dewey, Experience and Nature, 299.	  
4 Dewey, Experience and Nature, 179.	  
5 Ibid., 180.	  
	   55 
an environment of “complex social relationships in which mutual action, recognition, 
bonding, and prolonged raising of children are facts”6—a context which gives way to 
significant consequences. “The significant consideration is that assemblage of organic 
human beings transforms sequence and coexistence into participation.”7  
Dewey supports this idea in providing a general description of the development 
of language emerging out of the “distinctive patterns of human association.”8 Dewey 
maintains that a baby’s initial gestures and cries are not primarily expressive and 
communicative, rather they are “over-flow” and “by-products” that lack communicative 
intent. Nevertheless, this is precisely the context within which language comes into 
existence, as “The story of language is the story of the use made of these occurrences.”9 
Indeed, a baby’s cries are put to use in being interpreted on the plane of meaning and 
responded to. Despite the fact that “’Expression,’ or signs, communication of meaning, 
exits in such cases for the observer, [and] not for the agent,”10 over time this context 
eventually gives way to a situation in which baby and caretaker form a participative 
alliance and establish a genuine community of action.  
What is crucial from this description is that it is a quality of relating that makes 
language and communication possible—a quality of relating that I maintain is 
fundamental in occurrences of both meaning and aesthetic experience. In this, Dewey 
makes a significant distinction between human and non-human animals. 
By habit, by conditioned reflex, hens run to the farmer when he makes a clucking 
noise, or when they hear the rattle of grain in a pan. When the farmer raises his 
arms to throw the grain they scatter and fly, to return only when the movement 
ceases. They act as if alarmed; his movement is thus not a sign of food; it is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Thomas Alexander, John Dewey’s Theory of Art, Experience, and Nature: The Horizons of Feeling (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1987), 154.	  
7 Dewey, Experience and Nature, 175.	  
8 Ibid., 175.	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10 Ibid., 177.	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stimulus to flight. But a human infant learns to discount such movements; to 
become interested in them as events preparatory to a desired consummation; he 
learns to treat them as signs of an ulterior event so that his response is to their 
meaning. He treats them as means to consequences.11  
 
The distinction between the two is indicative of “the essential peculiarity of language, or 
signs;” that is, the establishment of “a situation in which the two parties share.”12  
As a follow up to this example, I would like to submit another example put forth 
by D.W. Winnicott that is exactly in line with the point Dewey intended with the 
example of chickens in comparison to a human infant. Focused on the perspective of the 
infant, Winnicott describes “the dawn of intelligence:”13 
Think of an infant expecting a feed. The time comes when the infant can wait a 
few minutes because noises in the kitchen indicate that food is about to appear. 
Instead of simply being excited by the noises, the infant uses the news item in 
order to be able to wait.14 
 
Indeed, unlike the chickens that flee when the farmer raises his arms, the baby in this 
example is able to interpret the analogous noises on the plane of meaning as an 
indication of food arriving soon. And taken in conjunction with the rest of Winnicott’s 
theory, this example goes even further as it fills out significant details that deepen 
Dewey’s account. Hence, this instance also describes the converse of the situation 
Dewey described above in which the baby’s initial gestures and cries are interpreted and 
made meaningful by a caretaker. Indeed, the kitchen noises themselves are not 
expressive of food or anything other than the result of objects being manipulated. But 
much like what his mother has done on countless occasions in response to the baby’s 
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Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc., 1997), 132.  
14 D.W. Winnicott, “From Dependence towards Independence,” cited in Abram The Language of Winnicott, 
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noises and gestures, the baby now does in response to the environment, as he15 
interprets the sounds to be expressive, communicating a meaning and makes use of 
these sounds as a participant in the situation. In this, Winnicott’s example offers a 
glimpse into the point of transition from the baby’s experience being a series of discrete, 
moment-to-moment occurrences to something more coherent and connected. This fits 
well with Dewey’s assertion, “When events have communicable meaning…they are 
more than mere occurrences; they have implications.”16 Hence, the noises are not just 
noises to the baby, but rather have implications and thus have meaning and 
consequence relevant to the baby.  
It is also noteworthy that in this instance the meaning for the baby is not the 
result of a full act of communication because the noises are merely signals. Hence, much 
like the “speech” of a parrot, the noises are not intended to communicate anything. But 
nevertheless, what is of the utmost significance is that in this case the baby has become a 
participant in the situation. In this, there is relationship between the baby and the 
situation and this is what makes meaning possible. Hence, meaning does not require a 
full act of communication. What is requisite, however, is a quality of relating that I 
contend is even more fundamental to meaning than communication. And this quality of 
relating is founded in the essential partnership that comprises what Dewey describes as 
the “peculiar” mode of human association.  
The Development of Meaning 
Dewey supports the idea that we are born into a world of immediate experience 
in which there is no meaning for the infant and that it is the “peculiar” mode of human 	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association that gives rise to intelligence, as the human infant becomes a partner in 
activity. In this, Dewey tells us communication is born, of which meaning resides at the 
heart as the thing shared in common between two partners. Indeed, Dewey talks about 
the “possession of the capacity to engage in…[cooperative] activity”17 as intelligence, but 
he does not offer a great deal of precision about the process through which intelligence 
of this sort emerges as a consequence. Fortunately, this is a point in which Winnicott’s 
account excels. Thus, in order to illuminate how meaning might emerge 
developmentally given Dewey’s broad framework I have continued to incorporate 
Winnicott’s ideas into the following discussion of Dewey’s theory. I believe this offers 
greater precision to Dewey’s philosophy and that reading these theories together opens 
up rich opportunities for a deeper understanding of this significant process, as 
Winnicott’s ideas not only serve as good examples but go even further to propose the 
way in which we learn to engage with the world on the plane of meaning.  
In its immediacy, Dewey tell us that consciousness “is something had, not 
communicated and known”18 and this is supremely the case for the infant in its earliest 
stage of development. Winnicott theorizes that at the start, the mother (that is, the 
mothering environment) adapts almost perfectly to the infant’s needs and in doing so is 
intimately attuned to the immediate sensation that is the infant’s experience. This is not 
to say that the mother literally feels the infant’s immediate sensations, but rather that she 
is empathetically attuned to the infant’s experience conveyed to her through his gestures 
and cries. In this, the infant’s immediate sensations are interpreted and made meaningful 
by the mothering environment through her appropriate response—although at this 
point the meaning resides almost solely on the side of the mother. At this stage, the 	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mother supports the infant’s immediate consciousness by indeed making it 
meaningful—even though the infant cannot yet know this meaning.  
Dewey tells us, “Meanings are rules for using and interpreting things; 
interpretation being always in imputation of potentiality for some consequence.”19 Even 
though Dewey does not offer this reference in any connection to infancy, the case of 
infancy provides the original and most potent example of this being the case. Indeed, the 
mother provides meaning to the infant’s immediate sensation by interpreting his 
reactions. In doing so, she provides “rules for interpreting things” and imputes 
potentiality for all future consequences. Remarkably, at this initial stage of development, 
her interpretation—that is, the rules she lays down—will provide the structure of 
meaning, itself, that the child will retain and re-make throughout life.  
For Dewey, meaning is oriented toward the future, but is at the same time reliant 
on a background of meanings established in the past. Hence, within a particular moment 
“meaning is awareness of…consequences before they actually occur.”20 To be sure, this 
is not to say that awareness of meaning is a magical act of fortune telling, but rather is an 
assessment of current circumstances in connection with a background of experience that 
points the way forward. Hence, “a meaning is a method of action, a way of action, a way 
of using things and means to a shared consummation.”21 Thus, I submit that within the 
mother-infant matrix, initial meanings as methods of action are laid down and begin to 
form the background required in order for meaning to subsequently exist for the baby. 
Indeed, the background of meanings required to make sense out of future situations 
gains its primary foothold in the mother-infant matrix in which the baby’s sensations are 
essentially transformed into meaning. Furthermore, it is no coincidence that within this 	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same context the establishment of partnership, which Dewey tells us is essential to 
language, is also founded.  
A Continuum of Sense 
Although the connection between aesthetic experience and meaning within 
Dewey’s philosophy is an underdeveloped area within the secondary literature, there 
are some notable exceptions. In particular, the work of Thomas Alexander and Victor 
Kestenbaum stand out. For my purposes in this chapter, Alexander’s analysis proves to 
be a close ally, as he establishes “the grounds for the claim that aesthetic expression 
presents us with a paradigmatic case of meaning rather than a peripheral one, as it has so 
often been regarded.”22 Alexander diligently attends to the detail of Dewey’s 
philosophy; drawing out how within an experience “the human impulsion for meaning 
and value is manifestly fulfilled.”23 Alexander’s work triumphs in upholding Dewey’s 
philosophy in the face of some of his strongest critics and shows above all that the 
central, guiding thought in Dewey’s philosophy is the aesthetic dimension of 
experience.24  
In short, I claim that when we explore experience which has been shaped into an 
aesthetically funded process, into “an experience,” we will discover Dewey’s 
paradigmatic understanding of experience. And this, in turn may lead to a more 
coherent understanding of the rest of Dewey’s philosophy. Experience as 
artistically shaped and aesthetically funded gives us also Dewey’s paradigmatic 
understanding of meaning.25 
 
Indeed, I would be remiss not to draw on Alexander’s excellent analysis in connecting 
Dewey’s theory of aesthetic experience with meaning as I continue to deepen this vital 
connection.  
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Alexander sorts out a significant aspect of Dewey’s account, providing a 
conceptual framework that unravels a point of confusion within Dewey’s theory of 
meaning. As Alexander points out, “Dewey does seem to contrast ‘immediate meaning’ 
of sense with the discursive or mediate meaning of signification and the immediate but 
unmeaningful presence of feeling.”26 One example of where this contrast can be seen is 
within Dewey’s discussion of consciousness in which he offers a distinction between 
two different ways the term “consciousness” is typically employed—a distinction that 
hinges upon meaning or the lack thereof. “On the one hand, [consciousness] is 
employed to point out certain qualities in their immediate apparency, qualities of things 
of sentiency, such as are, from the psychological standpoint, usually termed feelings.”27 
Dewey describes this form of consciousness as being anoetic—unthinkable—because 
“this is consciousness wherever meanings do not exist; that is to say apart from existence 
and employment of signs, or independently of communication.”28 And this 
distinguishes the other type of consciousness—the realm where meanings are clearly 
perceived. This type of consciousness implies the use of signification, but this is not 
necessarily always the case. Nevertheless, Dewey tells us, “Meanings do not come into 
being without language, and language implies two selves involved in a conjoint or 
shared undertaking.”29 The confusion within this account lies in a lack of precision 
regarding “how one shifts between these phases or how brute immediacy and relational 
mediacy can fuse together to create ’sense.’” 30 The use of the term “sense” is significant 
because it describes a third realm that is no doubt closely aligned with feeling, however 
where there is sense, there is meaning—thus marking a significant distinction. 	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Alexander’s suggestion is “to regard Dewey’s distinctions of feeling, sense[,] and 
signification as matters of degree along a continuum rather than as three separate modes 
of experience.”31 Thus, he continues, 
At one extreme, we can focus more on the immediate aspects, we tend toward 
“feeling,” losing sight of the unrealized potentialities of the project at hand. We 
pay attention to the present on its own account and ignore the future. At the 
other extreme, we can become absorbed in trying to mediate or locate the 
immediate in a future-oriented process, operation or context. We may become 
solely concerned with the final outcome of an action and its significance so that 
the immediate loses is qualitative luster in anticipation of those to come and 
becomes a bare sign. It is at these extremes of feeling and signification that 
experience is likely to fall apart and the means-end relationship become 
divided.32  
 
Alexander directs us between these extremes, explaining that it is within this realm we 
encounter aesthetic experience. “The ideal to which Dewey points is the continuous 
interplay of sense and signification so that the immediate is taken up into a broad and 
deep context which in turn is realized and brought to light in immediate experience. 
This is exactly what Dewey means by an experience.”33 This is a very significant point, to 
which I am working to add that the ideal of continuous interplay of sense and 
signification involves a quality of relation that I believe originates in the mother-infant 
milieu and extends out to all meaningful interactions between self and world.   
In an all too brief passage within Experience and Nature, Dewey explores the 
distinctions between feeling, sense, and signification. In doing so, Dewey offers a nice 
degree of precision that gives credence to the continuum Alexander proposed. “Sense is 
distinct from feeling, for it has a recognized reference; it is the qualitative characteristic 
of something not just submerged unidentified quality or tone.”34 Hence, there is 	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meaning in sense, whereas—at least from this vantage point—meaning is void in 
feeling. Put differently, Dewey tells us that sense is distinct from feeling because of the 
added property of mind, which requires the “organized interaction with other living 
creatures;”35 i.e. language and communication—or even more fundamentally, the 
establishment of partners. With this added property of mind, “the qualities of feeling 
become significant of objective differences in external things and of episodes past and to 
come….Feelings are no longer just felt. They have and they make sense; record and 
prophesy.”36 Indeed, the distinguishing factor between sense and feeling is a relationship 
between an immediate sensation and the recognition of a reference to something else, 
something that holds significance within a community for a future consequence.  
However, this relationship is not necessarily something that need be signified, as 
“Sense is also different from signification. The latter involves use of a quality as a sign or 
index of something else.”37 Thus, still distinguished from feeling, it is possible for sense 
to be in the form of immediate meaning: “The sense of a thing…in an immediate and 
immanent meaning; is the meaning which is itself felt or directly had.”38 In this, 
immediate experience may be void of signification, but it is not necessarily void of 
meaning. We see this same idea in Dewey’s assertion within the next chapter, “The 
nature of awareness of meanings cannot be conveyed in speech. As with other 
immediate qualitative existences, words can only hint, point; the indication succeeding 
when it evokes an actual experience of the thing in question.”39 In this, Dewey is 
describing the transition between an immediate meaning that is sensed, to one that 
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becomes signified, named—evoking an experience that is not only known, but also 
thought.  
Feeling within an Established Partnership 
Deepening this perspective further, I would like to submit that the distinction 
established between feeling and sense, hinging on the presence of meaning or the lack 
thereof, is less clearly delineated than conveyed above when you take into consideration 
the significance of the “peculiar” mode of human association. Indeed, I am proposing 
that there is a way in which meaning is always present given the “peculiar” mode of 
human association—the very thing which gives rise to language and intelligence. This 
comes to the fore through consideration of the continuum of sense in connection with a 
developmental perspective; that is, as a progression originating in infancy that leads to 
the eventual realization of sense and meaning through the establishment of partners. 
Hence, I uphold that there is a way in which the infant’s immediate feeling is 
meaningful despite the fact that the infant, himself, is not aware of it yet. This idea is 
supported in Dewey’s claim that “intelligence and meaning are the natural 
consequences” 40 of the “peculiar” mode of human association, but with Winnicott’s help 
I take this claim a step further.  
Thus, I contend that where the “peculiar” mode of human association exists, 
meaning necessarily resides on at least some level. Given the appropriate lens, we can 
see that this rings true from the very beginning of human life—that is, from the start of 
an individual human’s life who is born into the “peculiar” mode of human association. 
Shifting the perspective away from an infant conceived autonomously, Winnicott saw 
the entire unit of the baby residing within its environmental milieu. Echoing the 
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immense significance Dewey afforded the establishment of partners and the interaction 
between organism and environment, this idea came to the fore in the middle of a 
seminar in 1942 when Winnicott exclaimed “’there’s no such thing as a baby’—‘…if you 
show me a baby you certainly show me also someone caring for the baby….’”41 
With this in mind, let us reconsider the case of infancy in which the mother gives 
an infant’s gestures and cries meaning through her interpretive response. In this case, 
meaning is present, although it is true that the meaning resides almost completely on the 
side of the mother. However, it categorically cannot be the case that she is the sole 
purveyor of this meaning because the meaning is ultimately an interpretation of the 
infant’s sensation. Thus, to the extent that the mother gets it right and effectively 
responds the infant’s gestures and cries, she transforms his immediate sensations into 
meaning as an interpretation for some future consequence. In this, she supplies the very 
definition to meaning. And despite her immense role in generating this meaning, the 
meaning itself is nevertheless intimately connected to the infant’s immediate sensation—
rendering the human infant a partner in meaning from the very beginning. Thus, given 
Winnicott’s rich theoretical description, I contend that there is meaning even in the 
extreme case of an infant’s immediate sensation, as the infant is rendered a partner 
within the “peculiar” mode of human association.  
Eventually, this partnership becomes more robust, as the infant becomes able to 
take a greater share in the meaning. Hence, if we consider developmental growth along 
the continuum Alexander outlined, what initiates as shocks in feeling becomes 
something more through experienced partnership and the building up of a background 
of experience that can serve as a reference point from which to relate and make sense. 
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Indeed, having a certain amount of meaningful background—a background that is built 
up in relationship with another self and supplies the content that can be used for 
interpretation—makes it possible for sense to embody meaning. This supports Dewey’s 
claim that sensations themselves become a class of meaning, as “something qualitative 
and capable of objective reference….They are a class of meanings which embody the 
mature results of elaborate experimental inquiry in tracing out causal dependencies and 
relationships.”42 On this point, Winnioctt’s perspective greatly deepens Dewey’s 
account, as it offers an explanation for how the necessary background of sense-meanings 
originates. 
In sum, the process of rendering immediate sensation meaningful through 
interpretation for a future consequence comprises the root of the endeavor to make 
meaning. This process initiates in infancy, but is extended throughout life as we engage 
with and come to understand the world with a growing sense of nuance. Through a 
close reading of Dewey’s philosophy, Thomas Alexander pinpoints this idea precisely in 
saying, “Meaning is rather the very struggle to make the world coherent; it is the on-
going process of trying to make sense.”43 This is a process that depends upon a 
background of experience that I believe is developed in an intimate relationship 
originating in infancy. And I maintain that a quality of this relationship remains 
fundamental in all meaningful relations between self and world.  
Internalized Partnership 
Beyond infancy we may no longer require an external partner to be intimately 
attuned to our sensations in order to help us render them meaningful, but a quality of 
this initial partnership nevertheless persists. Indeed, by drawing on a background of 	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experienced meanings we are able to supply this function for ourselves and in doing so, 
the function of the original other is internalized. In this, we become related to the world 
through the internalization of this partnership. For this reason, I maintain that that in an 
essential way meaning can always be understood in terms of “two selves involved in 
conjoint or shared undertaking.”44 Indeed, whether it is literally the case that two selves 
hold a meaning in common for some participative alliance or if the function of an other 
self is internalized, a quality of relation remains fundamental.  
Although he uses different terms, I believe we can see this same idea reflected in 
Alexander’s analysis of Dewey’s philosophy. 
Meaning emerges from communication, from the effort of participants to modify 
and interpret a situation through a shared set of symbols in virtue of which the 
situation becomes common or takes on a common meaning for the participants. 
Language is the highest development of such a common symbol system and 
largely functions to coordinate other activities. But language creates new modes 
of shared life which it can directly embody. Language succeeds in so 
restructuring our world, that the world is encountered on the level of sense.45  
 
Hence, I am suggesting that on an essential level, language is the establishment of 
partners. Thus, what was once a literal partnership between mother and infant is the 
very thing that positions us to subsequently be in relation to the world through its 
internalization. In this, “new modes of shared life” become possible. Indeed, I am 
suggesting that underscoring Alexander’s assertion that language is what succeeds in 
restructuring our world, we find the internalization of an established partnership. Thus, 
in a very literal way, partnership is fundamental to meaning and I believe a quality of 
this partnership persists in all meaningful relations with the world. Furthermore, given 
this developmental origin and the literal transformation of an infant’s sensations into 
meaning through partnership, we can see just how it is that language (that is, 	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partnership) is what makes it possible for the world to be encountered on the level of 
sense.  
The Bounds of Sense and Meaning 
If a quality of relation is necessary for meaning to exist, the converse of this is 
that where this quality is lacking, so too is meaning. I believe that we can see this 
reflected through exploring the limits Alexander outlined in the continuum of sense. 
Alexander acknowledges that, at least in theory, these limits can be extended further, 
however he cautions that “it is best to regard ‘pure feeling’ and ‘pure signification’ as 
limiting terms, and, in fact, bizarre extremes impossible in themselves, of the continuum 
of ‘sense.’”46 This is because we cannot make meaning beyond these bounds and it is my 
contention that between these poles, we find the realm in which the quality—if not 
literal presence—of partnership endures.  
We have already explored one pole in the limit case of feeling, showing how the 
“peculiar” mode of human association manages to keep this limit in bounds through the 
establishment of partnership—even in the extreme case of infancy. Hence, it is the 
relationship between an infant and its mothering environment that manages to hold the 
infant within bounds, in spite of an infant’s limited capacity to participate. However, 
where this relationship wanes, we encounter a realm that is truly anoetic—an 
unthinkable domain of immediate feeling that lacks a connection to anything beyond the 
immediacy of sensation. Indeed, this is the realm one might call insanity. At the other 
extreme of “pure signification,” I envision a realm in which immediate presence is lost in 
abstraction and all that remains is a bare sign. Hence, much like computer code that runs 
itself, I believe that beyond this limit lies a realm of pure signification that lacks a 
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connection to anything beyond itself. Thus, as previously cited from Dewey, “While 
signaling acts are a material condition of language they are not language nor yet are they 
its sufficient condition;” its sufficient condition being “the establishment of cooperation 
in an activity in which there are partners.”47 In this, we can see that where connection—a 
quality of relation—is lacking, so too is meaning. This quality of relation is founded in 
the establishment of partners and is fundamental to meaning. Furthermore, this quality 
of relation is most supremely manifested in the case of aesthetic consummation.  
However, before moving on to a discussion of aesthetic consummation and 
aesthetic experience more generally, I want to point out a way in which we can also see 
these poles reflected in the work of D.W. Winnicott. Rather than focusing on the 
extremes of pure feeling and pure signification, however, Winnicott fills in the range 
between these limits in a discussion that I understand to be concentrated around aspects 
that are internal and external to a self, or stated differently, between self and world. In 
his discussion of creativity, Winnicott laid out two poles, outlining a spectrum of 
orientations between self and world that he uses to describe the limits of creative living. 
This is relevant to the current discussion because in Winnicott’s view creativity is at base 
a matter of the quality of relation between self and world. Coming very close to 
something Dewey might say, we can see this exhibited in Winnicott’s description of 
creativity manifested in someone “who is thinking in terms of the material that can 
actually be used so that his creative impulse may take form and shape, and the world 
may witness.”48 I read his discussion of creativity to ultimately address the quality of 
relation that enables meaningful contact between self and world, as his ideas are in 
accord with the bounds under current consideration.  	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At one end of the spectrum, Winnicott broadens the scope from a concentration 
limited to feeling to a consideration of all that is apparent within a self. I understand this 
shift in focus to be less extreme than the limit of pure feeling, but nevertheless to address 
this end of the continuum. Hence, Winnicott describes the situation in which an 
individual remains absorbed in the self and cannot make meaningful contact with the 
world. One instance of this is manifested in the case of hallucinations, in which 
imagination takes over and supersedes reality.  As Winnicott tells us, “hallucinations are 
[essentially] dream phenomena that have come forward into waking life.”49 Indeed, “for 
many individuals external reality remains to some extent a subjective phenomenon.”50 
This describes a situation in which there is a lack in the participative alliance or 
establishment of partners that is so fundamental to meaning. And in this lack, we find 
phenomena internal to the self that is not in relation to the world. Hence, one orientation 
between self and world in which meaning is limited involves an excess of what is 
internal to the self. This is exhibited in the overabundance of imagination in the case of 
hallucinations or even more extremely within the realm of “pure feeling” that is 
disconnected from an interpretation that would render it meaningful for a future 
consequence. In these occurrences, aspects of the self are not in relation to the world; as 
such, meaningful exchange is prohibited.  
In the other direction, Winnicott broadens the scope again. Rather than the 
extreme of pure signification, Winnicott considers individuals “so firmly anchored in 
objectively perceived reality that they are ill in the opposite direction of being out of 
touch with the subjective world and with the creative approach to fact.”51 It is fitting that 
Winnicott refers to this group as extroverts who live mostly on the outside, unable to 	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“get into touch with dream.”52 This orientation describes individuals whose 
“relationship to external reality…is one of compliance, the world and its details being 
recognized but only as something to be fitted in with or demanding adaption.”53 These 
individuals lack a sense of meaning in their flurry of activity. Hence, similar to a bare 
sign that could become meaningful if it were brought into a relationship with something 
beyond itself, the doings of Winnicott’s extrovert stand to significantly gain in sense and 
meaning through a relation to the internal self.  
As we will see, the same poles come to the fore yet again in Dewey’s discussion 
of aesthetic experience in his emphasis on the importance of a perceived relationship 
between doing and undergoing. I maintain that it is no coincidence that these poles 
align, as aesthetic experience is indicative of a rich engagement between self and 
world—an engagement of exquisite sensitivity and nuance that is perhaps best 
exemplified in the partnership in which meaning originates, that of mother and infant. 
However, Dewey does not directly name this intimate relationship as the root of our 
nature as aesthetic beings. Rather, Dewey casts a much wider net, grounding the 
aesthetic within the interchange of live creature and environment. What is essential in 
aesthetic experience is the quality of engagement within this interchange. Thus, my 
suggestion is that the quality of engagement indicative of aesthetic experience is one and 
the same with the fundamental condition of meaning itself—a relational quality between 
self and world that is the result of the “peculiar” mode of human association.  
Dewey’s Theory of Aesthetic Experience 
The concept of aesthetic experience encompasses a broad terrain. In the most 
expansive sense, whenever there is interaction between an organism and its 	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environment the result is an experience with the potential for at least some degree of 
aesthetic quality. This is because our world is neither utterly chaotic, comprised of mere 
flux with no order, nor already “finished” in the sense that it contains no resistance. 
Thus within every interaction with the environment, the live creature encounters—or at 
the very least is poised to encounter—some degree of resistance and disruption of 
equilibrium with the environment. In this, the live creature is in position to draw on the 
ordered relations that are present in the environment in order secure greater stability. 
And when participation with the environment comes after a phase of disruption and 
conflict, Dewey’s theory maintains that the resulting experience “bears within itself 
germs of a consummation akin to the esthetic.”54  
Dewey begins Art as Experience with “the live creature,” planting the seed of 
aesthetic experience decisively in the live creature’s interchanges with its environment.  
At every moment, the living creature is exposed to dangers from its 
surroundings, and at every moment, it must draw upon something in its 
surroundings to satisfy its needs. The career and destiny of a living being are 
bound up with its interchanges with its environment, not externally but in the 
most intimate way.55 
 
This intimate connection with the environment is the ground upon which our status as 
aesthetic beings rests. But Dewey goes further than this. As live creatures that make 
meaning, we draw on this intimate connection and use it in meaningful ways. “The 
rhythm of loss of integration with environment and recovery of union not only persists 
in man but becomes conscious with him; its conditions are material out of which he 
forms purposes.”56 This idea is key. Indeed, Dewey grounds our capacity as aesthetic 
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beings in our intimate connection with the environment, but also in our capacity to be 
conscious of this connection and to use it on the plane of meaning.  
Thus, while the seed of the aesthetic lies in the raw connection between the live 
creature and its environment, in order to grow to fruition there must also be a capacity 
to derive meaning from the rhythms of these intimate interchanges. “Contrast of lack 
and fullness, of struggle and achievement, of adjustment after consummated 
irregularity, form the drama in which action, feeling and meaning are one.”57 In this, the 
vital connection between aesthetic experience and meaning resides.  
Although Dewey was keen to emphasize the fundamental connection between 
live creature and environment for aesthetic experience, what does not come out as 
strongly in his writing is the equally important acknowledgement that for the live 
creature that is human, this environment is social. I believe recognizing this is of the 
utmost significance. Indeed, we have already seen that it is the “peculiar” mode of 
human association that brings about meaningful interchanges with the environment. 
Thus, although Dewey was right to locate the ground of the aesthetic within the 
interchanges of organism and environment, I believe we must also keep in mind that the 
aesthetic cannot come to fruition without meaning—and meaning relies on the 
establishment of partnership. Hence, I believe that in order to draw out the connection 
between aesthetic experience and meaning with greater precision, we need to consider 
Dewey’s discussion of aesthetic experience in light of the “peculiar” mode of human 
association and the original environment for us all; namely, the mothering environment. 
Indeed, I maintain that this is the place in which we first learn to connect with our 
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environment both meaningfully and aesthetically due to the exquisite attention afforded 
within the relationship of mother and child.  
Art and the Aesthetic 
Dewey surmises that art and the aesthetic emerge from the conditions of a live 
creature embedded in an environment that is neither all flux, nor already “finished” 
through the use of the rhythms of interchange with the environment on the plane of 
meaning. There is art in the gardener tending to her plants just as there is in 
experiencing the architecture of Paris, as art emerges when the connection between 
organism and environment is intensified through consciousness and meaningful use. 
While in some sense Dewey’s usage of the term art may appear to lessen its import by 
bringing it literally down to the earth we stand on, another way of looking at this is to 
consider that in doing so he is creating room for its full grander to be seen in connecting 
it with the conditions of who and how we are in the world. “Mountain peaks do not 
float unsupported; they do not even just rest upon the earth. They are the earth in one of 
its manifest operations.”58 And it is from this soil that Dewey contends “the greatest 
intellectual achievement in the history of humanity” emerges—“the idea of art as a 
conscious idea.”59  
Art is the living and concrete proof that man is capable of restoring consciously, 
and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse and action 
characteristic of the live creature. The intervention of consciousness adds 
regulation, power of selection, and redisposition. Thus it varies the arts in ways 
without end.60 
 
From this vantage point we can see that Dewey’s grounding of the aesthetic in the live 
creature’s interchanges with its environment makes it possible for a much deeper 
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significance of art’s value to come to the fore than the typical usage of the term “art” 
affords in its reliance on privileged objects set at remove from everyday experience.  
 Hence, the title, alone, of his major aesthetic text, Art as Experience, says a great 
deal about Dewey’s approach to art. That is, a work of art is not an object, but rather an 
experience with an object. “[T]here is a difference between the art product (statue, 
painting or whatever), and the work of art. The first is physical and potential; the latter is 
active and experienced. It is what the product does, its working.”61 Indeed, for Dewey 
the term art is used to indicate an intensification of our aesthetic grounding in the world 
that is realized within experience. Hence, the real “work” of art does not lie in the 
embodied object, but rather in the experience it affords. This applies not only to the 
work of the artist, but also to the work of the perceiver, as Dewey weaves artist and 
audience together in experience with art objects serving as mediators. For Dewey, 
experience is crucial, as art does not even exist until an object is experienced. 
Thus, the experience of art is significant in human life because it manifests the 
rhythms of our interchange with the environment and as such, reflects back to us our 
very beingness in the world. It is significant that the experience of rhythm through 
interchange with our environment is necessarily prior to the art objects such rhythms 
engender. Indeed, this is because we relate such rhythms to a background of experience, 
and in doing so they are rendered meaningful. “Underneath  the  rhythm  of  every  work  
of  art  there  lies,  at  substratum  in  the  depths  of  the  subconsciousness,  the  basic  pattern  of  
the  relations  of  the  live  creature  to  his  environment.”62  And on this point I am working 
to show that it is the quality of relation fostered at least as much as it is the content of 
such rhythmic exchange that is significant. Indeed, I maintain that this quality is 	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founded in the establishment of partners that defines the “peculiar” mode of human 
association and, furthermore, that this quality is the very thing that furnishes meaning. 
Music serves as a wonderful example of this. Indeed, not only does music 
provide instances in which rhythmic content is most literally present, but music also 
engages us in such a way that the quality of relation that is key in furnishing meaning is 
fostered. For example, the ebb and flow of the second movement of Beethoven’s Seventh 
Symphony provides an embodiment of an experience complete with moments of quiet 
tension, lush and intense eruptions that leave arm hairs on end, all the while pressing 
through, encapsulating an experience that eventually and subtly resolves. With an 
exhale that is understood this movement’s closing makes sense of all that has come 
before. And I maintain that the reason we understand this punctuation through time is 
because in experiencing it we render it meaningful through a relation to a background of 
meaningful experience—a background established through partnership. Thus, not only 
do we respond to the many layers of rhythmic content, but we do so because we have an 
experience with the same quality of partnership learned way back when, in the 
establishment of partners originally afforded us as organisms born into the “peculiar” 
mode of human association. 
Aesthetic Consummation  
One key to understanding Dewey’s aesthetic philosophy resides in his concept of 
consummation. Dewey is persistent in his emphasis on resistance and disruption of 
harmony between the live creature and its environment. In doing so, he is setting the 
stage for consummation occurring in the subsequent restoration of harmony. Dewey 
tells us that “life grows” in such moments of consummation because in overcoming a 
temporary falling out “a more extensive balance of energies of the organism with those 
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of the conditions under which it lives”63 emerges. And this moment of meaningful 
reorganization is central to Dewey’s conception of aesthetic experience. Accordingly, it 
is something that the artist in particular is attuned to. “Since the artist cares in a peculiar 
way for the phase of experience in which union is achieved, he does not shun moments 
of resistance and tension. He rather cultivates them, not for their own sake but because 
of their potentialities, bringing to living consciousness an experience that is unified and 
total.”64 And this is precisely what Dewey intends with his account of aesthetic 
experience.  
Although aesthetic consummation itself does not pin-point the quality of relation 
I am trying to draw out of Dewey’s discussion, there is no doubt that it is of chief 
importance for Dewey’s aesthetic theory. As such, there is a great deal that can be said of 
aesthetic consummation. Aesthetic consummation is a fulfilling of a situation—a 
cultivation of what has come before and transformation of individual parts into a 
collective whole that maintains and indeed amplifies the integrity of the individual 
parts. “[F]low is from something to something. As one part leads into another and as 
one part carries on what went before, each gains distinctness in itself. The enduring 
whole is diversified by successive phases that are emphases of its varied colors.”65  
Aesthetic consummation is the concluding result of a process—a process that is 
often long and arduous. And the moment of consummation can be misleading because 
in its climatic finish there is temptation to loose sight of all that has come before. Like a 
strike of lightening, the moment of consummation may well be illuminating, but this is 
not to betray the fact that “it is the focal culmination of long, slow processes of 
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65 Ibid., 38.	  
	   78 
maturation. It is the manifestation of the continuity of an ordered temporal experience in 
a sudden discrete instant of climax.”66  
This momentary climax of consummation is often followed by a period of calm. 
This is because aesthetic consummation is a satisfaction of situation. It is the creation of a 
new organization of energies that restores harmony. It soothes a situation for a time. It 
provides a resolution that is organically secured. And this is quite different from a mere 
cessation or stopping of activity that is unrelated to what has occurred prior.  
A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its 
solution; a game is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, 
playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking 
part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation 
and not a cessation.67 
 
However, what I find to be most important about aesthetic consummation is that 
it is a moment of growth and is thus relevant to education at a core level. In connecting 
the past and present in a way that is organically structured, aesthetic consummation 
establishes a new order that extends into the future.  It is “a fulfillment that reaches to 
the depths of our being—one that is an adjustment of our whole being with the 
conditions of existence.”68 And it is the creation of “a new relation to the environment, 
one that brings with it the potency of new adjustments to be made through struggle.”69 
Aesthetic consummation is an essential moment of learning in relation to the 
environment; it is a moment that touches the core of who we are as meaning-making 
creatures embedded in an environment.  
Doing and Undergoing 
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As important as consummation is for Dewey’s discussion of aesthetic experience, 
there is another main idea that Dewey uses to describe what gives an experience 
aesthetic quality that is at least as critical for education—if not more. In addition to 
consummation, Dewey discusses the importance of a relationship held within 
perception between doing and undergoing, a relationship that speaks directly to the 
relational quality I have been drawing out. As Dewey says, “The doing may be 
energetic, and the undergoing may be acute and intense. But unless they are related to 
each other to form a whole in perception, the thing done is not fully esthetic.”70 While 
this relationship between doing and undergoing is not exactly the same as 
consummation the two ideas are closely related. Aesthetic consummation is the natural 
and eventual outcome of a process of holding the relation of doing and undergoing 
together within perception; that is, through connecting what is done in the world and 
what it is for the self to undergo that doing. It is this relationship—and perceptual 
awareness of this relationship—that directs activity and eventually leads to a 
consummation between self and world that gives experience the quality of the aesthetic.  
There is something deceivingly simple about the notion of doing and 
undergoing. On the one hand, it seems obvious that we do things in the world and as we 
do them, we experience what we are doing—we undergo what is happening in the 
world. But to what extent is this really true?  
Oftentimes…there is distraction and dispersion; what we observe and what we 
think, what we desire and what we get, are at odds with each other. We put our 
hands to the plow and turn back; we start and then we stop, not because the 
experience has reached the end for the sake of which it was initiated but because 
of extraneous interruptions or of inner lethargy.71 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Ibid., 52.	  
71 Ibid., 36.	  
	   80 
Indeed, experience is often overburdened on the side of undergoing with “inner 
lethargy” or on the side of doing with “extraneous interruptions.” And when there is an 
imbalance between what is internal and external to the self, perception of the relation 
between the two is blurred and this “leaves the experience partial and distorted, with 
scant or false meaning.”72 Hence, while it might be easy to refer to a relation between 
doing and undergoing, it is another thing completely to perceive their relation within 
experience.  
Dewey describes how someone might experience the world with an imbalance 
on the side of receptivity (undergoing). “What is prized is then the mere undergoing of 
this and that, irrespective of perception of any meaning. The crowding together of as 
many impressions as possible is thought to be ‘life,’ even though no one of them is more 
than a flitting and a sipping.”73 When this type of imbalance occurs, true consummation 
cannot be realized because the individual is not meaningfully in touch with the objective 
world, as there is too much concentration on the side of the self. As Dewey tells us, 
“Inner harmony is attained only when, by some means, terms are made with the 
environment. When it occurs on any other than an ‘objective’ basis, it is illusory—in 
extreme cases to the point of insanity.”74 I maintain that this type of imbalance lies 
toward the end of the continuum of “pure feeling” and we can see just how well this 
idea fits given Winnicott’s aforementioned filling-out of this spectrum in his description 
of the situation in which an individual remains absorbed in the self and cannot make 
meaningful contact with the world.  
In the other direction Dewey also describes an imbalance on the side of doing. 
When this occurs, “Zeal for doing, lust for action, leaves…a person, especially in this 	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hurried and impatient human environment in which we live, with experience of an 
almost incredible paucity, all on the surface.”75 In this case, experience is “dispersed and 
miscellaneous,” and “resistance is treated as an obstruction to be beaten down, not as an 
invitation to reflection.”76 This case describes someone who is unable to relate a present 
undertaking with the perception of its undergoing, connecting it with a range of 
meanings and values from his or her past. In other words, when this type of imbalance 
occurs, activity in the world overpowers and disconnects from the self. I believe this 
relates to the other end of the spectrum, the realm in which signification and bare 
activity reigns supreme—but in a way that is disconnected from anything beyond itself, 
rendering its potential for meaning to be severely limited or even null. Indeed, this 
describes the case of Winnicott’s extrovert and outlines an orientation in which meaning 
wanes due to a lack of connection to the inner the self.  
Significantly, Dewey proposes these two types of imbalances as limit cases, 
placing the possibility of aesthetic consummation between their bounds.  Hence, 
“Between the poles of aimlessness and mechanical efficiency, there lie those courses of 
action in which through successive deeds there runs a sense of growing meaning 
conserved and accumulating toward an end that is felt as accomplishment of a 
process.”77 This growing sense of meaning and felt accomplishment is indicative of what 
is truly aesthetic: the presence of consummation within experience.  And since neither 
group effectively perceives the relation of doing and undergoing within their activities 
there can be no consummation. “There are beginnings and cessations, but no genuine 
initiations and concludings. One thing replaces another, but does not absorb it and carry 
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it on…Needless to say, such experiences are anesthetic.”78 Indeed, lying within these 
bounds—at the very heart of the continuum of sense and meaning—we find aesthetic 
experience; thus confirming aesthetic experience as meaning.  
But the connections do not end there. Indeed, Dewey’s description of doing and 
undergoing describes a relationship between an activity that is rendered meaningful and 
sensual awareness within oneself. And I contend that this connects directly to the 
previous discussion of the transformation of an infant’s sensation into meaning through 
the mother’s interpretive response, as she forms the vital connection between sensation 
and meaning to which Dewey now refers. Hence, not only does the relationship of 
mother and infant provide a good example of this phenomenon, but going further I 
maintain that it tells us about the origin of the capacity to hold together doing and 
undergoing within perception, itself. Indeed, through the internalization of the mother-
infant relationship, we provide this function for ourselves. As such, the quality of 
relation persists in all meaningful engagements with the world and I find that Dewey is 
speaking directly to this quality of relation in his discussion of doing and undergoing. In 
this, I maintain that perceiving a relationship between doing and undergoing is made 
possible do to another, more fundamental and more literal relationship—that of mother 
and infant.  
Thus, I submit that both Dewey’s aesthetic theory and theory of meaning rely on 
a relational quality between self and world that originates in a developmental unfolding 
that connects the two on a fundamental level. This is significant because in locating this 
developmental origin the connection between aesthetic experience and meaning is 
deepened. But going even further, I maintain that this developmental origin provides a 
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theoretic framework that speaks to the cultivation of this type of relating.  And given 
that this relational quality is the essential bond between aesthetic experience and 
meaning, fostering its realization becomes fundamental to education. 
Cultivating Aesthetic Experience and Meaning 
Indeed, the linkage between aesthetic experience and meaning is particularly 
significant for education because is tells us that we must look to aesthetic experience in 
order to foster meaning, which is no doubt central to education. Hence, although the arts 
themselves are unfortunately not always considered core to education, one would be 
much more blatantly remiss to make this same oversight in consideration of the 
importance of meaning and the process of making meaning for education. What this 
discussion reveals is that aesthetic experience lies at the heart of the meaning-making 
endeavor and that the quality of relation common to both is what educators should aim 
to foster. In this, the arts have a great deal to offer all of education in serving as 
exemplars for fostering aesthetic experience—a realm of experience that is no doubt 
present in the arts, but also extends beyond the scope of things like music and painting, 
as aesthetic experience is fundamentally rooted in the interaction between self and 
world.  
What is of the utmost significance given Dewey’s discussion of aesthetic 
experience is that perceiving a relationship between doing and undergoing is critical for 
all of education. Indeed, not only does the perception of doing and undergoing describe 
the quality of relation that eventually leads to consummations that are the embodiment 
of meaning, learning, and growth, it also describes the fundamental condition of 
meaning itself. In this, the educator’s role becomes one of tending to the continued 
process of doing and undergoing. Indeed, while aesthetic consummation is itself a 
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manifestation of doing and undergoing, it is an achievement that can only be realized 
through a sustained process of such relating. “Like the soil, mind is fertilized while it 
lies fallow, until a new burst of bloom ensues.”79 Thus, even though aesthetic 
consummation might be one very important goal, as it describes the moment that 
meaning is realized, the educator’s focus should not be on consummation itself, but 
rather on fostering its conditions. In this, perceiving the relation between doing and 
undergoing is even more critical for education than consummation. Furthermore, the 
fact that people often struggle with imbalances on either side of doing and undergoing 
points to an educational need for its cultivation.  
However, this marks the place in which Dewey’s theory leaves off. Although 
Dewey effectively names this quality of relation, as well as its lack in either direction, his 
work simply does not tell us much about its cultivation; he merely stresses its import. 
This provides yet another opening for Winnicott’s theory to contribute. Hence, not only 
does Winnicott’s theory furnish this discussion by deepening and filling in significant 
aspects of Dewey’s theory in linking aesthetic experience and meaning, Winnicott also 
offers a great deal of insight regarding the cultivation of this relational quality. Indeed, 
psychoanalysis is primarily concerned with offering therapeutic support and Winnicott 
was particularly interested in cultivating this relational quality in his work with patients.  
Winnicott approached psychotherapy as a form of playing—“it has to do with 
two people playing together.”80 Playing is the word Winnicott uses in addressing the 
relational quality I have been speaking to throughout and I believe we can find good 
examples of this form of playing in the relational quality fostered within the music 
classroom. Thus, I submit another example of literal partnership found within music 	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education in instances of call and response among musicians. Although this type of 
musical exchange is perhaps most commonly thought of within the context of jazz 
music, we can find instances of it within most musical genres and can be utilized at all 
levels of musical instruction—from beginning to advanced students. One way of 
implementing this form of playing within a music classroom might be to improvise 
simple rhythmic phrases back and forth with a student in which the teacher responds to 
the student in such a way that it becomes a direct commentary or response to what has 
come before within the exchange. There are literally endless variations to this basic 
technique and when done well a participative alliance—partnership in activity—is 
established. Indeed, what is key in this example is the quality of relating that is fostered 
and in this, the exchange of interpretive responses is not unlike that of the mother and 
infant. We find a similar type of relation in the play Winnicott established in his work 
with children through a technique he developed called the Squiggle game.81 In playing 
this game a participative alliance is formed in which the participants try to turn one 
another’s squiggle drawings into something interesting through continuing on where 
the other’s squiggle left off. In these brief examples, we see an extension of the original 
partnership established in infancy between mother and child, further manifesting the 
“peculiar” mode of human association that gives rise to intelligence and meaning in the 
first place.  
I believe that once we know what to look for (i.e. the quality of relation I have 
been discussing throughout), further examples will abound. Indeed, this quality of 
relation lies at the core of the “peculiar” mode of human association and is thus 
something we are not strangers to. As teachers we can foster this in a number of ways: 	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Explorations, ed. C. Winnicott, C. Bollas, M. Davis, and R. Shepherd (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 299-317.  
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through the literal relationships present in our classrooms and by extension through 
engagement with mediums, be it written and spoken language, colors and shapes, or 
sounds and gestures. In this, we can see aesthetic education as a continuation and 
further refinement of the immense educational unfolding that initiates at birth. Indeed, 
through taking seriously the idea that the limit cases of aesthetic experience are non-
coincidentally one and the same as the limit cases of meaningful interaction between self 
and world, we are in position to support an immense educational unfolding that in 
many ways can be seen as the overarching aim throughout all of Dewey’s philosophy.  
Thus, in the beginning of Art as Experience Dewey remarks, “In a life that is truly 
life, everything overlaps and merges. But all too often we…are divided within 
ourselves.”82 In this divide, the quality of relation that is so fundamental to aesthetic 
experience and meaning alike splits apart. However, we avoid this split in fostering the 
conditions for aesthetic experience and in doing so are fostering the conditions for the 
conditions for meaning to flourish.
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CHAPTER 4 
A POTENTIAL BASIS FOR THE IDEAL: 
JOHN DEWEY’S PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNTHOUGHT KNOWN 
Throughout the preceding chapters, I have been discussing the relation between 
imagination and reality from various angles. In chapter two this tension was exemplified 
in a discussion of Winnicott’s transitional phenomena, which at a fundamental level 
relies on a paradox—and the acceptance of the paradox—that what is created is also 
discovered. As such, in order for external reality to become “real” (i.e. meaningful and 
useable) to an infant, Winnicott tells us that we must protect the space for imagination 
and reality to come together and that this protected space endures throughout life in 
what Winnicott conceives of as cultural experience. In this, there is no straightforward 
reconciliation between the two, as imagination and reality continually work together in 
meaningful experience.  
Chapter three makes a similar point through examining and highlighting the 
quality of relation between self and world that persists in instances of meaning making. 
Significantly, this quality of relation is paradigmatically exemplified in aesthetic 
experience and thus we find a crucial bond between meaning making and aesthetic 
experience. This extends the conversation concerning the relation between imagination 
and reality, as it offers the insight that we should be paying attention to and working 
toward cultivating the quality of relation founded in Dewey’s “peculiar” mode of 
human association in order to foster meaning making and aesthetic experiences.  
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In this chapter, I will be discussing the relation between imagination and reality 
again, this time by drawing on the work of Victor Kestenbaum whose recent book on 
John Dewey’s philosophy draws out tension between Dewey’s account of the two that 
brings a vital question to the fore concerning what the ideal means within Dewey’s 
pragmatism. In raising this question Kestenbaum is resisting the dominant view within 
Deweyan scholarship. Nevertheless I think he is successful in unraveling and exposing 
an unresolved tension surrounding the relation between imagination and reality within 
Dewey’s writings. In doing so, Kestenbaum raises important questions concerning the 
place of the ideal within Dewey’s philosophy.  And while Kestenbaum does furnish this 
question with an answer—namely, “It is as much an act of faith as it is a discovery of 
fact that we behold the sublime at the intersection of imagination and reality, or indeed 
at any intersection at all”1—this is not an answer that leaves us resting in a final solution. 
Rather, much like art itself, is an answer that ends in wonder.2  
This place of wonder in which Kestenbaum leaves off leads me yet again to a gap 
within Dewey’s account that unremittingly calls my attention: the developmental origin 
for both aesthetic experience and meaning. As such, Kestenbaum’s questions concerning 
the role of the ideal within Dewey’s philosophy offer a rich opportunity to tend to this 
gap further and to connect my project with current conversations within Deweyan 
scholarship. 
Thus, my aim in this chapter is to pick up Kestenbaum’s question concerning the 
role of the ideal within Dewey’s philosophy. In doing so, I will examine Kestenbaum’s 
claims and pay attention to the places that Kestenbaum alerts us to tension within 
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2 This is in reference to Dewey’s assertion, “Philosophy is said to begin in wonder and end in 
understanding. Art departs from what has been understood and ends in wonder.” (Art as Experience, 281).  
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Dewey’s account. In conjunction with this examination of Kestenbaum’s work, I will 
offer my own interpretation by proposing what might indeed be the developmental 
basis for the ideal within human experience. In doing so, I will be moving beyond the 
scope of either Dewey or Kestenbaum and will draw on contributions from 
psychoanalytic theory that extend the foregoing conversation concerning the relation of 
imagination and reality. In this, I propose a way to understand the no more than human, 
but also no less than transcendent position of the ideal within human experience. 
Kestenbaum’s Question 
While there has been a range of interpretations concerning Dewey’s idealism that 
includes the stance that Dewey completely rejected idealism, that he essentially 
embraced it, and that he accepted and transformed some of it,3 the consensus view, 
which Thomas Alexander embraces, is that Dewey broke with idealism in 1903 with his 
Studies in Logical Theory, joining the new pragmatic movement.4 Thus, the “more or less 
the prevailing stance in Dewey scholarship [is] that the ideal has a natural basis and that 
when the natural seeks ideal fulfillment, the latter must be reconciled to the former.”5 
Kestenbaum does not deny that this position is not only present, but is predominant 
within Dewey’s writing. Nevertheless, Kestenbaum carefully tends to moments in which 
Dewey at least temporarily suspends the requirements of reality. In doing so, 
Kestenbaum draws out tension within Dewey’s account and raises valuable questions 
regarding the place of the ideal within Dewey’s philosophy.  
From the start, it should be clear that Kestenbaum is not suggesting that Dewey 
embraced ideals that are fixed or absolute. Indeed, Dewey clearly rejected such notions 
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University of New York Press, 1987), 42.	  
5 Kestenbaum, The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal, 7.	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of the ideal. Nevertheless, Kestenbaum maintains that for Dewey “ideal 
meanings…could function in experience in ways which were not fixed or absolute, that 
is, in ways which encourage their fuller realization.” And while Dewey is keenly 
interested in reconciling the ideal with the real, a harmonization that is supremely 
manifested within “The Act of Expression”6 and aesthetic consummation, Kestenbaum 
shows that there are places within Dewey’s philosophy in which the authority of the 
ideal is allowed to maintain some precedence.  
This view relies on what Kestenbaum sees as Dewey’s “primacy of meaning 
thesis,” that “meaning is wider in scope as well as more precious in value than is truth.”7 
Thus, Kestenbaum presents the case that Dewey’s “pragmatism is an attempt to respect 
the authority of the ‘tangible and the real’ at the same time that it does justice to 
meanings which transcend the verified and the evident and which, in their most perfect 
expressions, are intimations of the ideal.”8 Thus, while Kestenbaum offers no disavowal 
of the instrumentalism and naturalism that is so central to Dewey’s pragmatism, his 
work nevertheless closely attends to the places within Dewey’s philosophy that 
transgress “the expectations of a well-behaved instrumentalist-naturalist philosophy.”9 
In this, Kestenbaum teases open the places within Dewey’s philosophy in which “the 
ideal ‘outruns’ the actual, leaving our practices and habits, and pragmatism itself, in a 
less certain state.”10 
Throughout The Grace and Severity of the Ideal: John Dewey and the Transcendent, 
Kestenbaum explores what he refers to as “pragmatic occasions of transcendent and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See John Dewey’s fourth chapter, “The Act of Expression,” in Art as Experience (New York: Perigee, 
1934/2005), 60-84.  
7 John Dewey, “Philosophy and Civilization,” in Philosophy and Civilization, cited in Kestenbaum, The Grace 
and the Severity of the Ideal, 2.  
8 Kestenbaum, The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal, 1. 
9 Ibid.	  
10 bid., 26.  
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intangible ideals.” Some chapters closely and explicitly attend to Dewey’s philosophy 
whereas others embrace the “spirit” of Dewey’s work through hermeneutical play based 
on Dewey’s thinking. In this chapter, I will be concentrating mostly on Kestenbaum’s 
final chapter, “Dewey, Wallace Stevens, and the ‘Difficult Inch,’” in which Kestenbaum 
attends closely to a few of Dewey’s texts: one chapter of Psychology (1887) and some 
chapters of Art as Experience (1934). Throughout this chapter, Kestenbaum is working “to 
observe Dewey trying to find a standpoint from which to behold the sublime and its 
elevations.”11 In doing so, Kestenbaum identifies places in Dewey’s early and later works 
in which Dewey appears to allow the authority of the ideal to have some precedence 
over the real. In this, Kestenbaum offers reason to question the role of the ideal within 
Dewey’s philosophy.  
The purpose of Kestenbaum’s final chapter is to suggest “that the basic question 
life asked of Wallace Stevens regarding ‘whether the sublime was livable’ is essentially 
the same one asked of John Dewey, or at least the same one asked by Dewey in his 
philosophy.”12 In order to show how this is the case, Kestenbaum asks, “What can 
sublimity, imagination, or transcendence mean in Dewey’s pragmatism?”13 And 
Kestenbaum then goes on to show us that, indeed, whether we conceive of this 
“something more” as sublimity, imagination, or transcendence it is clear that it has an 
important place throughout Dewey’s philosophy. 
An Examination of Dewey’s Early Writings on Imagination 
Kestenbaum opens up the space for his question to take root through the lens of 
a poem by Wallace Stevens in which an interesting idea is proposed—that of particulars 
bending to the abstract in what Stevens refers to as “the difficult inch.” Following this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., 203.	  
12 Ibid., 201. 	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up through an examination of Dewey’s 1887 chapter on imagination in Psychology, 
Kestenbaum shows how at this early point Dewey’s career, he was “well on the way to 
bending particulars to the mind’s—and imagination’s—abstractions.”14 This comes to 
the fore through Dewey’s discussion of creative imagination: 
Creative imagination develops this ideal element, and frees it from its connection 
with petty and contingent circumstance. Perception and memory both have their 
worth because of the meaning of the perceived or remembered thing, but this 
meaning is subordinate to the existence of the thing. Imagination reverses the 
process; existence is subordinate to meaning.15 
 
In this, Dewey is asserting that the existence of something within imagination is 
dependent on it having meaning, rather than meaning being dependent on existence as 
we might expect given Dewey’s naturalism. This reversal is the first place in which 
Kestenbaum alerts us to tension within Dewey’s account concerning the relation of 
imagination and reality. 
As Kestenbaum shows, this tension can be understood through a distinction 
Dewey affords between the functions of idealizing imagination and universalizing 
imagination. Kestenbaum explains these functions in saying, 
Idealizing imagination overshoots fact and reality. Universalizing imagination 
overshoots fact and reality in order to return to them the ‘permanent meaning of 
facts.’ In the latter, unlike the former existence is not ‘subordinate to meaning’ 
because natural existence is construed by Dewey to be a condition for the 
possibility of meaning.16 
 
Going beyond the letter of what Dewey offered in this early text, Kestanbaum suggests 
that the relation between idealizing and universalizing imagination can be understood 
as a process of imaginative activity. In this, idealizing imagination functions as an 
intermediary that allows the self a kind of free-reign to play in service of the individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid., 204. 	  
15 Dewey, Psychology, cited in Kestenbaum, The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal, 205. 
16 Kestenbaum, The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal, 206.	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self in a way that is unconfined by the contingency of existence. “The meanings of 
idealizing imagination range beyond existence.”17 However, “the universalizing 
imagination bends these meanings back to existence, back to natural existence.”18 
Kestenbaum sums up this process saying, “Idealizing imagination draws us away from 
reality and toward the unreal. The universalizing moment of imagination draws us 
through and then away from the unreal and fantastic so as to transform the real. Thus 
does the ‘difficult inch’ become the sublime inch.”19 
With this, Kestenbaum highlights and explores a moment in which we can 
observe Dewey in this early text working to reconcile the real and the unreal. 
Kestenbaum’s reading is generous in that he goes beyond the categorization of 
imaginative activity that Dewey put forth, bringing the ideas to life through putting 
Dewey’s text in conversation with Wallace Stevens. In doing so, Kestenbaum identifies a 
common vulnerability that Dewey and Stevens share through their attempts to reconcile 
their adherence to the free-reign of imagination with the constraints required by reality. 
In “The Noble Rider and the Sounds of Words,” Stevens identifies and sums up an 
undeniable problem concerning this position: “The imagination loses vitality as it ceases 
to adhere to what is real. When it adheres to the unreal and intensifies what is unreal, 
while its first effect may be extraordinary, the effect is the maximum effect that it will 
ever have.”20 With this, I believe Kestenbaum is right in asserting that Dewey would no 
doubt agree with Stevens regarding the need for imagination to maintain connection to 
reality in order to “sustain us” and to possess vitality. And yet despite the implied 
consensus between Dewey and Stevens in reference to this concern, Kestenbaum 	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19 Ibid.	  
20 Wallace Stevens, “The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words,” cited in Kestenbaum The Grace and Severity 
of the Ideal, 207.  
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maintains and later demonstrates how “neither the philosopher nor the poet could put 
aside ‘the unreal of what is real.’”21  
Despite his generous reading of what Kestenbaum calls Dewey’s “early 
equivocations,” Kestenbaum is ultimately unconvinced. Reflecting on his own sketching 
of Dewey’s position, Kestenbaum wonders if his presentation of Dewey’s ideas renders 
fact, idealizing imagination, and universalizing imagination as being all too external to 
one another. In this, the products of creative imagination amount to either mere “idle 
play” or duplicates of reality. And this does not satisfy the requirements of the 
universal, as “The universal is what prevents imagination’s alienation from reality from 
degenerating into narcissistic self-deception and self-dispersion.”22 Moreover, “The 
universal redeems imagination’s excesses, but also, and more important, it gives the 
imaginer a place to stand to behold the sublime.”23  
With this, Kestenbaum highlights an overarching concern; namely, that “there 
can be no experience of transcendence for human beings which involves ‘more than 
human things’ or ‘more than human voice.’”24 Endeavoring to clarify and further 
develop Dewey’s overall position, Kestenbaum recasts Dewey’s idealizing and 
universalizing imaginations as insubordinate imagination and natural imagination, 
respectively. In doing so, Kestenbaum is working to find solid ground for imagination to 
find its true grandeur all the while setting up a conceptual framework that he will draw 
from later in his argument. Thus, Kestenbaum invites us to wonder how Dewey can 
incorporate an insubordinate imagination, which ranges beyond existence, back into his 
philosophy of experience.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Kestenbaum The Grace and Severity of the Ideal, 208.	  
22 Ibid.	  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 209; Kestenbaum is drawing in quotations from Wallace Stevens’ “Chocorua to Its Neighbor,” in The 
Palm at the End of the Mind. 	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In doing so, Kestenbaum draws out a core dilemma. If we allow imagination the 
freedom to range beyond existence, how can we then use imagination’s resources to 
uncover the hidden meaning of actual things? Put differently, how can we manage to 
stay grounded in reality and still allow imagination the free-reign Dewey describes? We 
want imagination to help us to get more in touch with the real so that we can live with a 
kind of vitality that will endure and grow. And if we allow imagination too much reign, 
if we give it the authority to run amuck, it is simply not clear how it can be worked back 
into experience with the real such that it can be rendered useable, meaningful, and vital.  
A Preliminary Proposal 
Based on Winnicott’s perspective, which was discussed in the previous two 
chapters, I would like to offer a preliminary association that may provide a way of 
understanding these two disjuncts. Indeed, I am struck by a parallel between the free-
reign Dewey sometimes affords imagination and the experience of omnipotence that 
Winnicott theorizes we are all born into; that is, as long as this experience is properly 
supported within the illusionment stage of the process of differentiation.  
Thus, in Dewey’s 1887 description, imagination is considered as “a stage in the 
development of knowledge where the self and its interests are explicitly freed from 
slavery to the results of the action of mechanical association.”25 While Kestenbaum is 
struck by the uncompromising freedom Dewey allows imagination within this passage, 
Winnicott liberates this idea even more than the early Dewey. Indeed, Winnicott not 
only allows imagination to be freed from slavery to the results of actions, but goes even 
further to say that it is the results of action that actually serve the infant. Hence, “The 
mother, at the beginning, by an almost 100 per cent adaptation affords the infant the 
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opportunity for the illusion that her breast26 is a part of the infant. It is, as it were, under 
the baby’s magical control….Omnipotence is nearly a fact of experience.”27 
The connection I am getting at is that the experience the infant is afforded at this 
stage would necessarily be “freed from slavery to the results of the action of mechanical 
association.” Indeed, to the extent that the mother is successful in illusioning her infant, 
the baby would be free from any need to be concerned about the results of his actions 
because “The mother’s adaptation to the infant’s needs, when good enough, gives the 
infant the illusion that there is an external reality that corresponds to the infant’s own 
capacity to create.”28 In this, rather than facing any burden of needing to fit in with or 
adhere to external requirements, an experience that the world is actually the “slave” of 
the infant is afforded.  
This idea is radical. Going beyond the extreme of idealizing imagination put 
forth by the early Dewey, Winnicott describes a necessary experience in which not only 
is imagination allowed to run amuck, but also one in which reality bends to meet the 
unruly demands of imagination. Thus, “The mother places the actual breast just there 
where the infant is ready to create, and at the right moment.”29 Yet, notice that Winnicott 
says “Omnipotence is nearly a fact of experience.”30 Hence, all the while allowing 
imagination to have excessive reign, Winnicott is fully aware that this experience of 
omnipotence is only nearly a fact. That is, it is as close to being a fact as it could be from 
the standpoint of experience—and yet, it is not a fact.  In this, Stevens’ suggestion of 
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28 Ibid., 16.  
29 Ibid., 15.	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particulars bending to the abstract within “the difficult inch” might well ring true within 
experience, while not exactly bending in fact.  
Thus, when Kestenbaum suggests that according to the early Dewey, “The 
projections of imagination do not receive their auspices from the past, from ‘experiences 
already had’; neither do their exertions of imagination have to do principally with the 
visible,”31 he and Dewey are offering that imagination aims for something beyond 
experience. But what if that is not quite right? What if what is aimed for is not only 
grounded in experience, but is grounded in the foundation of all experience? And yet, 
all the while this experience might not be grounded in actual fact. Could it be that the 
stage of illusionment allows for the reversal Dewey spoke of in 1887 in which “existence 
is subordinate to meaning” and that, in this, we find a basis for the ideal firmly situated 
within human experience? 
Examining Art as Experience 
After establishing the unruly and unresolved role of imagination within Dewey’s 
early philosophy, Kestenbaum sets off to examine several chapters of Dewey’s 1934 Art 
as Experience. Kestenbaum offers an intriguing and insightful reading of Dewey’s first 
two chapters before extending his analysis to chapters eleven and twelve in which 
Dewey’s discussion of imagination is explicit and takes on peak significance. 
Kestenbaum’s ultimate position is that “there is good reason…to take [Dewey’s] 
endorsement of ‘negative capability’ in the thirties as a continuation of his endorsement 
of idealizing imagination in 1887.”32 In this, Kestenbaum is showing that Dewey did not 
(and perhaps could not) completely let go of the ideal within his philosophy despite the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Kestenbaum The Grace and Severity of the Ideal, 205. 	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conflict this may cause given his commitment to naturalism concerning the ground on 
which we stand in allowing for such excess of imagination. 
Chapter One: The Live Creature 
Dewey’s first chapter, “The Live Creature,” endorses a deeply naturalistic view. 
As established in the previous chapter, aesthetic experience is at base a matter of 
organisms interacting with their environment. “The first great consideration is that life 
goes on in an environment; not merely in it but because of it, through interaction with 
it.”33 Kestenbaum extends this idea in asserting,  
The somewhat disguised or at least covert premise of the chapter is that meaning 
does not originate in itself, but like life itself is an accommodation to, and 
transformation of, what is other than itself…Meaning’s origin, its original, is the 
environment of the empirical world with which we are in constant interaction.34  
Within this chapter Kestenbaum asserts that we do not find traces of imagination’s 
reversal, as meaning must be adjusted to existence. Accordingly Dewey stresses, “Inner 
harmony is attained only when, by some means, terms are made with the environment. 
When it occurs on any other than an ‘objective’ basis, it is illusory—in extreme cases to 
the point of insanity.”35 Having established Dewey’s naturalism within this first chapter, 
Kestenbaum moves on to his analysis of chapter two.  
However, before turning the page so quickly, there is one important point from 
this first chapter that I would like to highlight, as I believe it supports my basic proposal 
regarding what might be the developmental basis for the ideal. All the while stressing 
the importance of staying connected to the world and objective reality, Dewey offers, 
“through the phases of perturbation and conflict [that lead to aesthetic consummation], 	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34 Kestenbaum, The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal, 210.  
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there abides a deep-seated memory of an underlying harmony, the sense of which haunts 
life like the sense of being founded on a rock.”36 Could it be that this haunting memory 
is an experience that underlies all experience—indeed, an experience of the ideal? Is it 
possible that this memory affords us the motivation and the desire to press on through 
perturbation and conflict, not only for the sake of overcoming obstructions, but 
moreover because we are compelled to do so, as the experience of being founded on a 
rock both grounds us in and haunts us with a taste of the ideal? I suggest that this might 
indeed be the case and, furthermore, that holding his position need not conflict Dewey’s 
naturalism.  
Chapter Two: The Live Creature and “Etherial Things” 
Kestenbaum next turns to Dewey’s second chapter, “The Live Creature and 
‘Etherial Things,’” in which he finds a glimmer of Dewey’s early endorsement of reality-
defying imagination. Kestenbaum offers that the chapter is devoted to giving sense a 
good name as sense provides a point of connection between the things of nature and 
ethereal things. “The first step in accomplishing this is to make sense a full-fledged point 
of meaning-producing contact with the world.”37 I developed my own reading of 
Dewey’s philosophy in support for this position in the previous chapter through my 
description of an infant’s sensation being literally transformed into meaning through a 
mother’s interpretation and response. However, I made this point by drawing on 
Experience and Nature and Kestenbaum alerts us to a deepening of this insight within this 
second chapter. As such, Dewey says, “Sense, as meaning so directly embodied in 
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experience as to be its own illuminated meaning, is the only signification that expresses 
the function of sense organs when they are carried to full realization.”38 
The second step Kestenbaum identifies in Dewey’s quest to give sense a good 
name is to describe experiences of “acute aesthetic surrender.” Kestenbaum cites Dewey 
as he accounts for the basis of such experiences in the stirring “into activity resonances 
of dispositions acquired in primitive relationships of the living being to its 
surroundings, [which are] irrecoverable in distinct or intellectual consciousness.”39 
Dewey then links this insight with the ideal saying, “There is no limit to the capacity of 
immediate sensuous experience to absorb into itself meaning and values that in and of 
themselves—that is in the abstract—would be designated ‘ideal’ and ‘spiritual.’”40 In 
this, we find Dewey saying that there is a natural basis for experiences of “acute 
aesthetic surrender” and that these immediately sensuous experiences contain what we 
identify as the ideal. Thus, here we find Dewey affirming a natural basis for the ideal. 
Kestenbaum refers to this as Dewey’s “most assertive expression” of his rehabilitation of 
sense and summarizes Dewey’s position as follows: 
Nature allows, is agreeable to, idealization. However, idealizing activities such as 
those of the imagination can never fully silence the “resonances of dispositions 
acquired in primitive relationships of the living being to its surroundings.” 
Poetry, all art, deepens rather than cancels out the indebtedness of reality-
defying projections of the mind to the reality-affirming resonances of the 
“difficult inch.”41 
 
Notice the tension Kestenbaum implies between idealizing activities and nature, 
in his reading of Dewey not permitting idealizing activities to have the capacity to silence 
the “resonances of dispositions acquired in the primitive relationships of the living 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Dewey, Art as Experience, 22. 	  
39 Ibid., 29.  
40 Ibid.	  
41 Kestenbaum, The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal, 212. 
	   101 
being to its surroundings.” In this, we see an interpretation that idealizing activity might 
otherwise lack at least some kind of compatibility with nature. Although I am 
challenging this reading through my proposal that the roots of idealizing activity might 
indeed have a natural basis, Kestenbaum’s interpretation nevertheless leads to an 
interesting question and answer, which allows for a deeper investigation of Dewey’s 
account. As such Kestenbaum asks: “Can, and must, the flights of imagination be bodied 
forth in a sense always bearing traces of, resonances of, its natural environment? To the 
natural imagination the answer is yes. To the insubordinate imagination the answer is 
no.”42 With this, Kestenbaum teases open Dewey’s appeal to Keats’ “negative 
capability”—a move that proves significant for both Kestenbaum’s project as well as my 
own. For Kestenbaum, this provides an opportunity to crack open “an unobtrusive, 
almost imperceptible abridgement of the sanctions afforded by fact.”43 And for my 
purposes, I find doing so offers credence to the suggestion I am advancing regarding the 
potential basis for the ideal. 
Dewey “enthusiastically” endorses Keats’ “’Negative Capability’; as one who 
was ‘capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching 
after fact and reason’”44 and Kestenbaum notes where Dewey praises those who do not 
need to reach after “consecutive reasoning.” However, Kestenbaum also notes that 
Dewey “is silent as to whether imaginative meanings must reach after fact.”45 With this, 
Kestenbaum opens up Dewey’s reading of this “negative capability” and in doing so 
creates room once again for imagination to be freed from adherence to fact. 
Do not reason, knowledge, and reflection in some nontrivial way take account of 
the environment, incorporating it into their determinations? If so, does not the 	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“putting aside” of reason’s objections mean that the objections of fact, of actual 
existence, also have been put aside? Perhaps Dewey was not minimally but 
deeply aware that for one possessing “negative capability” meaning cannot be 
anchored in fact anymore than it can be anchored in reason….Perhaps, after all, 
Dewey did recognize that the capacity for being in “mysteries”…necessarily 
means that reason’s longings cannot be fulfilled, even when abetted by nature.46 
 
With this, Kestenbaum is right back to his central dilemma concerning how Dewey can 
allow imagination such free reign without loosing vitality and becoming nothing more 
than “castles in the sky.” And even if we accept my suggestion that the basis of 
imagination’s freedom resides in our earliest interactions with the world, Kestenbaum’s 
dilemma still adheres, as it is not clear how this early experience fits in with our later 
experiences that require a much firmer grasp on reality.  
Examining Imagination  
Dewey provides an extensive discussion on imagination toward the end of 
chapter eleven, “The Human Contribution,” and the beginning of chapter twelve, “A 
Challenge to Philosophy.” Kestenbaum keenly observes that by extending these titles 
slightly, a description of the place of imagination within Dewey’s philosophy comes to 
the fore: “Imagination is the highest human contribution to experience and as such its 
role in Dewey’s philosophy of experience hardly can be exaggerated.”47 But no matter 
the immense role of imagination within Dewey’s philosophy, this is not to say that 
Dewey’s treatment of imagination is without conflict. And this conflict, as demonstrated 
by Kestenbaum, is essentially the same tension we have been following throughout this 
analysis; namely, whether imagination can have the authority to resist constrains that 
are required by nature (i.e. the insubordinate imagination) or whether imagination’s role 
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needs to be limited to supporting the possibilities of nature as we find in the natural 
imagination.  
Kestenbaum picks up on a place within “The Human Contribution” in which 
Dewey does not seem to be entirely clear about the relationship between the two. In a 
discussion of the conflict artists undergo, Dewey aims to explicate the nature of 
imaginative experience through the lens inner and outer visions. While the two modes 
of vision wrestle back and forth within the artistic process, Dewey ultimately says, “The 
artist is driven to submit himself in humility to the discipline of the objective vision. But 
the inner vision is not cast out. It remains as the organ by which outer vision is 
controlled, and it takes on structure as the latter is absorbed within it.”48 In this, Dewey 
seems at first to be saying that objective reality takes precedence, as the artist must 
submit in humility to the discipline of this outer vision. But next Dewey seems to be 
hinting yet again at imagination’s reversal when he says that inner vision is what 
controls the outer vision and that outer vision must be absorbed within the inner vision. 
This leads Kesenbaum to raise some questions: “What, precisely, has the objective 
contributed if imagination controls, directs, the objective? How does the ‘object of 
external vision’ offer much resistance to the inner vision when the latter controls 
external vision?”49 In response to these questions, Kestenbaum concludes that Dewey 
has built a variation on the “airy Citadel” and persists in cracking open the spaces in 
which Dewey allows for the insubordinate imagination. 
To be clear, Dewey does offer a way of reconciling this concern in the sentence 
that follows the quotation Kestenbaum highlights. Thus, Dewey continues, “The 
interaction of the two modes of vision is imagination; as imagination takes form the 	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work of art is born.”50 In this, I believe Dewey is relying on the version of imagination 
that Kestenbaum refers to as Dewey’s natural imagination—and Kestenbaum offers no 
dispute about the fact that most of the time Dewey supports the natural imagination, 
which ultimately requires imagination to reconcile with the real. We see an example of 
this version of imagination (i.e. natural imagination) again in Dewey’s later assertion 
that “Time is the test that discriminates the imaginative from the imaginary. The latter 
passes because it is arbitrary. The imaginative endures because, while at first strange 
with respect to us, it is enduringly familiar with respect to the nature of things.”51  
Nevertheless, Kestenbaum persists, finding that Dewey offers the insubordinate 
imagination at least some credence. As Kestenbaum explains, 
To say, as Dewey does, that the “interaction” of inner and outer vision is 
imagination simply affirms the reciprocal, egalitarian character of the activities of 
natural imagination. It also, however, tends to gloss all those assertions of the 
insubordinate imagination which do not measure themselves according to 
whether mind and material “squarely meet and interpenetrate.” Joining with 
nature, becoming one with it, is not imagination’s sole aim. Often, imagination 
would like to control—in all the transforming and transfiguring senses of 
“control”—the objective, the outer, the natural.52 
 
If Kestenbaum is right and if this is indeed a place in which Dewey’s appeal to the 
insubordination imagination appears, I believe we are in position to consider my 
proposal given the reading Kestenbaum affords. Thus, I offer that it might indeed be the 
case that in imagination’s aspirations to “control” we are experiencing reverberations of 
the experience of omnipotence afforded in earliest stage of development and that while 
this foundation is “natural” in the sense that it has a real experiential basis, it still might 
not be true in reference to actual fact.  
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I submit this proposal for further consideration as we look to Kestenbaum’s 
continued analysis. Kestenbaum highlights the end of “The Human Contribution” with 
a quotation in which Dewey is less exacting about the requirement of reconciliation with 
the real. Hence, Dewey says, “Philosophy is said to begin in wonder and end in 
understanding. Art departs from what has been understood and ends in wonder. In this 
end, the human contribution in art is also the quickened work of nature in man.”53 In 
this, Kestenbaum detects another reversal, but rather than reversing meaning and 
existence as Dewey did forty-seven years prior, this time Dewey is less clear with the use 
of the term “wonder.” Kestenbaum asks,  
What differentiates understanding from wonder?...Does wonder perhaps take 
Dewey as close as he can to transcendence not possessed by a self because the 
self has dissolved?...What happens to pragmatism when the “real world” it 
wishes to handle, the reality with which it wishes to interact and penetrate, is 
unconfined by wonder and imagination?54 
 
This marks an exciting point within Kestenbaum’s analysis as well as within 
Dewey’s philosophy as we turn the page to chapter twelve, “A Challenge to 
Philosophy.” In this chapter Dewey takes up the make-believe and play theories, both of 
which are formulated in terms of imagination. Based on this observation Kestenbaum 
concludes that despite the indirect treatment, we can see that “Dewey cannot let go of 
the problem of imagination”55 and asserts that “Dewey seems to know that his 
pragmatism, as well as his aesthetics, has something important at stake in his account of 
imagination.”56   
Although Dewey ultimately finds fault in the make-believe theory, his discussion 
of it upholds the critical importance of imagination within aesthetic experience. Indeed, 	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aesthetic experience is a type of experience that does not merely reproduce or imitate 
reality and Dewey goes so far as to say, “because of the domination of esthetic 
experience by imaginative quality, it exists in a medium of light that never was on land 
or sea.”57 In this moment Kestenbaum yet again identifies a place in which “Dewey 
agrees with Stevens that imagination ‘creates images that are independent of their 
originals,’” as “never having been ‘on land or sea,’ such light is a contribution or 
addition to reality [and] its original…is not in nature.”58 But this is not to say that 
imagination is sufficient for aesthetic experience and this is Dewey’s main objection to 
the make-believe theory; hence, “an esthetic product results only when ideas cease to 
float and are embodied in an object.”59 However, emphasizing imagination’s vital 
contribution, Kestenbaum finds that not only can Dewey “allow for a reversing 
subordination of existence to meaning early in the aesthetic experience; indeed he must 
have such a reversal in order for an aesthetic experience…to realize possibilities not 
realized in ordinary experience.”60 With this, a chief question again comes to the fore: 
Reverie, dream, illusion, and insubordinate imagination are elisions. They 
displace or at least disrupt reality by making and marking a break with the 
environment. In their grip, I become detached from “objective materials.” Objects 
float. I float. Natural objects are unconfined, but so too is the self. Having a place 
to stand to behold the elision of the real is unimportant, since the self as 
standpoint has been elided. Simply put, both environment and self are 
transcended in moments of sublimity. How do we get back to reality?61 
 
Kestenbaum’s question of how we can get back to reality is a central concern 
throughout his final chapter. And it is an important question. Indeed, this question not 
only adheres, but also takes on even greater significance and pertinence if we accept my 
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proposal that the places in which imagination seems to outrun reality within Dewey’s 
philosophy might well be connected to our earliest experiences—which I propose is the 
same as Dewey’s “deep-seated memory of an underlying harmony, the sense of which 
haunts life like the sense of being founded on a rock.”62 In fact, accepting my proposal 
brings an even bigger question to the fore; namely, if we are born into an experience of 
omnipotence, a “larger than life” experience that is perhaps the closest we ever get to 
knowing and tasting the ideal, how do we ever come to know the real world?  
Getting Back to Reality 
I believe addressing the more fundamental question of how it is that we come to 
know the world in the first place (and in doing so, become a self) provides insight that 
may help to reconcile Kestenbaum’s concern. Furthermore, I believe that the fact that 
this question keeps coming up within Dewey’s philosophy offers credence to the idea 
that the process of becoming a self persists throughout life, as the self is continually 
refined within aesthetic experience. In chapter two, I described the process of 
differentiation as laid out by Winnicott, which offers a way of a way of understanding 
the more fundamental question pertaining to the initial establishment of self as well as 
providing insight into ways this earlier process continues to unfold throughout life. As 
such, I believe there are several important points from this prior discussion that bear 
fruit for addressing the questions Kestenbaum raises.  
Born Into an Illusion 
I have alluded to the first important point throughout this discussion in the 
establishment of the illusion of omnipotence that we are born into. While it does not 
directly answer how it is we come to know reality, it is nevertheless a crucial aspect of 
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the overall process, as it is the necessary precursor to the achievement of self. Hence, 
Winnicott tells us that although “the mother’s eventual task is gradually to disillusion 
the infant,…she has no hope of success unless at first she has been able to give sufficient 
opportunity for illusion.”63 Thus, our earliest interactions with the world might well 
constitute an illusion that we retain as a vital memory that persists, “haunting” us 
throughout life.  
Christopher Bollas is a leading figure in contemporary psychoanalytic theory 
and he follows the trace of this early relationship within adult life. In The Shadow of the 
Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known, Bollas describes this early experience as  
an identification that emerges from symbiotic relating, where the first object is 
‘known’ not so much by putting into an object representation, but as a recurrent 
experience of being—a more existential as opposed to representational knowing. 
As the mother helps to integrate the infant’s being…the rhythms of this 
process—from unintegration(s) to integration(s)—inform the nature of this 
‘object’ relation rather than the qualities of the object as object.64 
 
In this, Bollas is emphasizing that at this stage the mother is deeply and profoundly 
known, although she is not known as a separate person. I believe that the rhythms of her 
process of reintegrating her infant with the world lay down the initial rhythms of 
interaction with the environment that Dewey so intensely picked up on. We can see the 
deep significance Dewey affords the experience of such rhythmic exchange in his 
statement, “Contrast of lack and fullness, of struggle and achievement, of adjustment 
after consummated irregularity, form the drama in which action, feeling, and meaning 
are one.”65 In this, Dewey is commenting upon the fundamental connection between 
organism and environment. And indeed, these comments ring profoundly true in the 
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case of an infant interacting with his or her first environment, which establishes a 
foundation of rhythmic interchange that we retain in a form of knowing at the deepest 
layers of our being. Hence, what Bollas refers to as the “unthought known.” 
Bollas focuses on the profound imprint of this early memory and the way it later 
manifests itself in the adult’s “quest” to “surrender” to various mediums in hopes of 
reenacting this early perceptual identification. Metamorphosis of the self is central to 
this mode of being, as the mother is experienced as a process of transformation that 
“lives on in certain forms of object-seeking in adult life, when the object is sought for its 
function as a signifier of transformation.”66 However, while the mother is no doubt 
immensely transformative of the infant’s self at this early stage of perceptual 
identification, I believe that we can say even more about her function beyond 
transformation. Thus, I would like to extend Bollas’ discussion of transformation to also 
include what we later come to identify as the ideal. With this, I am suggesting a way in 
which psychoanalytic theory might benefit from connections to Dewey’s philosophy, as 
considerations of the ideal offer a more overarching conceptualization of the impact of 
this profound early experience. 
Within the “aesthetic moment” Bollas identifies “a deep subjective rapport with 
an object (a painting, a poem, an aria or symphony, or natural landscape) and [the 
subject] experiences an uncanny fusion with the object, an event that re-evokes an ego 
state that prevailed during early psychic life.”67 I believe that the re-evocation of this 
early state of being could very well offer us the experience of particulars bending to the 
abstract and perhaps the trace of this early experience is what Kestenbaum is picking up 
on within Dewey’s writings. Indeed, I find it plausible that in bending the world to meet 	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their infants, what mothers do in fact creates an experiential imprint that lives on within 
the realm of illusion and imagination that we know on a deep level and continually seek 
throughout life. 
Breaking with Illusion and Becoming a Self 
But Kestenbaum is right that this illusion cannot sustain us, as it not only does 
not provide us with ground to stand on, it does not allow for a self at all. Thus, if we 
accept Winnicott’s assertion that we are born into an illusion, we must eventually find a 
way to break with this illusion in order to get in touch with reality and therefore to 
develop a healthy self. This brings us to the second important point; namely, 
disillusionment, which is what ultimately the process that allows for the self to emerge 
through contending with reality. As we have already seen, the process of 
disillusionment involves the mother’s gradual lessening of adaption to her infant. From 
the mother’s perspective there is nothing immense occurring within the moments of 
frustration she allows her infant, but in doing so she is indeed paving the way for her 
baby to meet reality and fact, and thus to develop as an independent self.  
I offer a now favorite example to illustrate this point: “Think of an infant 
expecting a feed. The time comes when the infant can wait a few minutes because noises 
in the kitchen indicate that food is about to appear. Instead of simply being excited by 
the noises, the infant uses the news item in order to be able to wait.”68 I believe this 
significant point in development provides a key for helping us to understand how we 
subsequently “get back to reality,” as Kestenbaum asks. We have already seen that this 
developmental milestone marks the beginning of the baby separating out from the 
environment in becoming aware of his own need and in so doing he is emerging as an 	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individual self. In addition, the baby is developing his own purpose with the world, as 
he uses real material of the world (i.e. kitchen noises) as a symbol to help him 
understand his environment and contend with frustration. Purpose in the world is key 
to this example and I do not think it is a coincidence that purpose is also Dewey’s 
answer to this question. 
Thus, Dewey tells us that purpose implicates the individual self in the most 
organic way and I believe that purpose goes a long way toward answering the question 
of how we come to know reality as well as how it is we “get back to reality.”  
It is in the purposes he entertains and acts upon than an individual most 
completely exhibits and realizes his intimate selfhood. Control of material by a 
self is control by more than just “mind”; it is control by the personality that has 
mind incorporate within it. All interest is an identification of a self with some 
material aspect of the objective world, of the nature that includes man. Purpose is 
this identification in action. Its operation in and through objective conditions is a 
test of its genuineness; the capacity of the purpose to overcome and utilize 
resistance, to administer materials, is a disclosure of the structure and quality of 
the purpose. For, as I have already said, the object finally created is the purpose 
both as conscious objective and as accomplished actuality.69 
 
I believe this speaks to the question Kestenbaum raised as to “whether the 
sublime was livable” and his suggestion that this is the basic question asked by Dewey 
in his philosophy. Hence, in realizing our most intimate selfhood through purpose and 
implication with objective conditions, we stand to navigate a course that aims toward 
the sublime. Looking broadly at Dewey’s philosophy, I believe it is safe to say that for 
Dewey the overarching aim of all manifestations of purpose is to restore harmony 
between the organism and the environment—and perhaps this aspiration might well be 
a quest to restore our connection to the ideal and thus to find (or at least aim toward) a 
way to live the sublime. This is exemplified in the works of art Dewey keenly picked up 
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that take harmony as an important constitutive aesthetic feature. However, it is 
important to note that this is not a full answer to the question of whether the sublime is 
actually livable. Rather, in identifying purpose in this way, I believe Dewey is pointing 
us in the direction of how we might find a way to live the sublime, if it is indeed 
something that can be livable.  
Deeping this account of purpose further, we find Dewey’s understanding of the 
development of purpose in his analysis of the play theory. While he is in favor of much 
of what the play theory allows, his only resistance to the theory is that it does not 
“recognize that esthetic experience involves a definite reconstruction of objective 
materials.”70 Dewey demonstrates what he means by drawing out a key distinction 
between the play of a kitten and the play of a growing child, saying that the former “has 
a certain order as an activity, in consonance with the structural needs of the organism, 
[but] does not modify the object played with except by a change of its spatial position, a 
more or less accidental matter.”71 By contrast, Dewey says the play of a growing child 
has purpose as a common thread that runs through a succession of acts. “In playing with 
blocks the child builds a house or a tower. He becomes conscious of the meaning of his 
impulsions and acts by means of the difference made by them in objective materials.”  
While I agree that there is a key distinction to be made concerning the play of a 
child and that of a kitten, I want to redraw the line of demarcation as I find that Dewey 
was not precise enough in his analysis. Hence, I resist the developmental trajectory 
Dewey laid out in demonstrating a child’s growing capacity to use objects in the world 
as the embodiment of purpose in contrast to a kitten. Dewey says, “The first 
manifestations of play by a child do not differ much from those of a kitten. But as 	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experience matures, actives are more and more regulated by an end to be attained.”72 
Although I agree that as experience matures purpose with the world becomes more 
manifest and robust, I think Dewey is missing something critical at the earliest stages of 
development. Indeed, the play of Winnicott’s baby is not arbitrary or accidental. Hence, 
Dewey is not recognizing the ways that the first manifestations of play by a child might 
indeed contain purpose with the world that might not be tangible in the use of objects, 
but are nevertheless distinct from the play of a kitten in a meaningful way.  Thus, I 
contend that the baby in Winnicott’s example is creating an object in the world—i.e. a 
symbol that is derived from the material substance of the kitchen noises—and that in 
doing so the noises and the meaning conjoin into a symbol and become the embodiment 
of purpose. Although this is more subtle than the later play of the child who uses blocks 
in “becoming conscious of the meaning of his impulsions and acts by means of the 
difference made by them in objective materials,” I believe Winnicott’s example provides 
insight into an infant doing something similar with the objective material of sound. 
Indeed, even if the “difference made” is only occurring within the consciousness of the 
infant, this difference is of paramount significance and I think recognizing this 
difference would provide an important contribution to Dewey’s philosophy. Thus, I 
want to extend Dewey’s consideration of what constitutes the reconstruction of objective 
materials to also include the very real “difference made” in the case of Winnicott’s baby.  
But what is more is that in extending Dewey’s account to accommodate the 
“difference made” in the cases of Winnicott’s baby, we are also extending our 
understanding of the point of intersection between imagination and reality—the very 
place Kestenbaum concludes that we behold the sublime.73 Thus, in recognizing this 	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“difference made” we are also allowing room for this intersection to blur a bit, as along 
side purpose in the world, we also find Winnicott’s baby enacting his own omnipotent 
creation. Indeed, in accepting Winnicott’s account, we must allow that the baby is both 
creating and discovering the kitchen noises. In allowing for this paradox and 
understanding its crucial role within development, I believe we can further crack open 
an understanding of the continued role this paradoxical intersection might well play 
throughout human development. Thus, I believe it is plausible that we may indeed find 
the ideal residing alongside purpose with objective materials in the world and that in 
this we find a richer account of how the sublime might be livable. 
The Value and Limitation of Outrunning the World 
I maintain that initial transitional objects make way for a capacity to experience 
transitional phenomena throughout life. In this, we retain a trace of the infantile 
experience of omnipotence in the meeting of imagination and reality. And while it might 
be true that there are occasions in which imagination does outrun reality and that in 
these instances the self does not have solid ground on which to stand, it is important to 
recognize the value as well as the limitation of such instances.  
The limitation of these instances may be easier to recognize, as this is what we 
have been wrestling with throughout this discussion. Indeed, where imagination 
outruns reality, the self remains aloof—sometimes to the point of being tortured by the 
irreconcilability of the real the ideal. Dewey spoke of this struggle in the beginning of 
Human Nature and Conduct, giving voice to the problems this can cause within lived 
experience: 
In varied ways men come to live in two worlds, one the actual, the other the 
ideal. Some are tortured by their irreconcilability. Others alternate between the 
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two, compensating for the strains of renunciation involved in membership in the 
ideal realm by pleasurable excursions into the delights of the actual.74 
 
This also speaks to Kestenbaum’s worry concerning reality degenerating “into 
narcissistic self-deception and self-dispersion,” as this is precisely the risk of imagination 
running too far amuck. Winnicott, too, gives voice to this ever-present concern saying,  
From birth, therefore, the human being is concerned with the problem of the 
relationship between what is objectively perceived and what is subjectively 
conceived of, and in the solution of this problem there is no health for the human 
being who has not been started off well enough by the mother.75 
 
But in working with objective conditions, Dewey affords that the self is continually 
refined, as Dewey is aware that this is a concern and something we work through 
throughout all of life.  
In short, Dewey tells us that “the self is created in the creation of objects.”76 
Indeed, we need “the tang of overt conflict and the impact of harsh conditions” because 
without it “art has no material.”77 This is exactly in line with Winnicott’s discussion of 
disillusionment, which is rife with the tang of conflict and contending with harsh 
conditions. Dewey not only picks up on this, but he powerfully connects the tang of 
disillusionment with a process that persists throughout life in the continual 
development of self. 
Individuality itself is originally a potentiality and is realized only in interaction 
with surrounding conditions. In this process of intercourse, native capacities, 
which contain an element of uniqueness, are transformed and become a self. 
Moreover, through resistances encountered, the nature of the self is discovered. 
The self is both formed and brought to consciousness through interaction with 
environment. The individuality of the artist is no exception. If his activities 
remained mere play and merely spontaneous, if free activities were not brought 	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77 Ibid., 293.	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against the resistance offered by actual conditions, no work of art would ever be 
produced. From the first manifestation by a child of an impulse to draw up to the 
creations of a Rembrandt, the self is created in the creation of objects, a creation 
that demands active adaption to external materials, including a modification of 
the self so as to utilize and thereby overcome external necessities by 
incorporating them in an individual vision and expression.78 
 
However, this explanation does not address another fundamental question. 
Hence, if the self is created in the creation of objects, what motivates and fuels this 
process? Throughout his philosophy, Dewey does provide an answer to this question—
namely, obstruction and resistance from the environment. But is obstruction and 
resistance enough? Indeed, what is the moving force that motivates and allows for the 
meeting of obstructions in the first place? This is a question Kestenbaum raises within 
the second chapter of The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal, stating, “it would be at least a 
bit odd to claim that the desire, the love, the eros, embodied in the exercise of their 
habits is motivated solely by the desire, to meet obstacles and obstructions.”79 Thus, 
Kestenbaum concludes that desire need be “fueled by something more worthy than the 
obstruction. The fact that desire can be obstructed tells us that obstruction is not the end, 
the goal, the motive force of desire. Something transcending the obstruction is the 
occasion and the perfection of desire.”80 
Thus, I propose that the moving force of desire, the something that transcends 
obstruction and occasions the perfection of desire through the continual refinement of 
self is “the deep-seated memory of an underlying harmony” that Dewey spoke of in 
“The Live Creature,” “the sense of which haunts life like the sense of being founded on a 
rock.”81 I put forth that this “deep-seated memory” may in fact be a literal memory of a 
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time before words, in the warm embrace with the world that we are afforded through 
the mothering environment. In this, I propose we find a foundation for the ideal. And in 
this, I believe we also find the reason Winnicott insists that “there is no health for the 
human being who has not been started off well enough by the mother.” Indeed, in this, I 
believe we find the value of imagination’s authority to sometimes outrun reality, as this 
spurs us to continually work to restore harmony with the environment and in doing so, 
further refine the self.  
Yet, we should also recognize the tragic price that we pay in the creation of self. 
Hence, in forming a self we loose a deep and profound merger with the world that that 
the mother-environment affords. Heinz Kohut, a prominent psychoanalytic theorist, 
speaks powerfully to this loss. 
You too, like all of us have lost your innocence, have fallen from grace. You too 
like all of us, must have your moments of doubt whether our values, our 
meanings as portrayed by our art, philosophy, and religion, are not in truth 
illusions. And you too, like the rest of use cannot always call up the sense of 
inner security, wholeness, and joyful certainty that is given to us at times….You 
too, like the rest of us, must, therefore realize…that there is no return passage to 
paradise—only a forward move. That we must strive toward…’infinite 
consciousness,’ that the fruit from the tree of knowledge is our only available 
sustenance, is our only quite unreligious, salvation.82 
 
And although there can be no “return passage to paradise,” Kohut insists that this loss is 
something we can be grateful for.  
Indeed I believe that we can even be grateful for the fact that the disturbed 
wholeness of our self will never by fully and permanently restored—neither by 
religion and philosophy nor by science and art—because it is the very 
incompleteness of man’s self…which spurs him to his greatest achievements, 
which keeps alive in him, to the end of time, the attempt to recapture the lost 
wholeness of his self.83 
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Indeed, the ideal might well be a memory of merger with the world, an 
experience of omnipotence that we are born into. Ironically this experience of wholeness 
and completeness of the “self” is in fact the very antithesis of what constitutes the self in 
actuality, as the formation of self requires a fall from grace in the meeting of harsh 
conditions through the process of disillusionment. And although this is a process of 
immense formative significance within early life, I maintain that it is not a process that is 
ever completed once and for all. Thus, Dewey tells us, “There is always a gap between 
the here and now of direct interaction and the past interactions whose funded result 
constitutes the meanings with which we grasp and understand what is now 
occurring.”84 Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that we find the continued growth and 
refinement of self throughout life in aesthetic consummation, which resides at the 
intersection of imagination and reality. However, no matter the achievement of self such 
consummation might provide, it is of the utmost significance that imagination continues 
to outrun reality and that we retain a trace of our early experiences of merger and 
omnipotence, as this provides a way to continue the process of growth that is inherent to 
life itself.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE  
This dissertation is calling for a shift in our thinking about the mode, meaning, 
and purpose of education by recognizing and responding to the aesthetic dimension of 
learning. This is a particularly important message to heed today given the high stakes 
testing movement, which is based on an extremely narrow conception what education 
should aim for and thus functions such that the quality of relation that is central to both 
meaning making and aesthetic experience is all too often overlooked. This is problematic 
because this quality of relation is central to the growth and development of the self. 
Furthermore, while there is no doubt that it is important for students to be proficient 
within academic domains, it is even more critical that we do not loose sight of the fact 
that at the most fundamental level education is not about teaching a core set of academic 
subjects, but rather about teaching subjects that are human.  
Above all, I have aspired to demonstrate how aesthetic experience is 
fundamental to the growth and development of the self. This is well established within 
John Dewey’s philosophy, but this insight is deepened and becomes even more 
pronounced through considerations of D.W. Winnicott’s account. As such, the example 
of Winnicott’s baby and the kitchen noises serves as a linchpin for understanding the 
emergence of an infant’s self as he begins to make meaning through the use of material 
that both is and is not a part of himself. Thus, we encounter the realm of transitional 
phenomena, which is intimately tied to aesthetic experience as well as meaning making. 
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And as much as this is a story of becoming differentiated in developing purpose with 
external reality, it is at the same time a story of maintaining connection to what indeed 
might be the foundation the ideal within human life.  
I am thus proposing a view of education that takes seriously the growth and 
development of the self and aspires to continually cultivate the conditions that foster 
aesthetic experience—the realm in which we find the paradigmatic case of meaning 
making and in which the self continues to grow and develop in relationship with the 
world. As much as this view of education is interesting from a philosophical standpoint, 
it is most significant for what it offers educational practice. As such, my aim in this 
chapter is to draw out some key implications of this approach for the way we go about 
educating students. 
At perhaps the broadest level, this view of education calls for a significant shift in 
focus for educational policy by placing the growth and development of the self at the 
center of the educative endeavor. This is a significant shift, indeed, away from test scores 
functioning as the proxy for our educational aims and consequentially driving our 
educational methods. By contrast, I am suggesting that we focus our aspirations on a 
more holistic notion of the self that we are educating. Thus, I contend that education 
should be about educating citizens who can contribute to as well as make use of culture 
in the broadest sense and I believe that the way to accomplish this is to take seriously the 
aesthetic dimension of learning.  
At a more concentrated level, I believe that implications for this view of 
education become particularly pronounced through considerations of the education of 
teachers. As such, it is within this realm that the aesthetic mode of learning must come 
to the fore with a particular emphasis on the developing the self of the teacher such that 
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the teacher will be able to extend this approach with students. Accordingly, much of this 
chapter is devoted to establishing a basis for teachers to draw from. This basis is 
necessarily rooted in experience, but this is not to dismiss the importance for teachers to 
have a theoretical grasp as well. Moreover, discussions of teacher education lend 
themselves well to broader discussions of educational practice in general and this will 
naturally fall out within the discussion that follows. 
Hence, in what follows I will draw out some key components of how this 
approach would work in educating teachers. I will address the importance of 
establishing an experiential basis for teachers to draw from and will support this idea by 
discussing the scope implementation, what an aesthetic method of teaching might look 
like, and draw on metaphors from the arts that can serve as a model for how this type of 
education would work. 
Aesthetic Experience as a Basis for Practice 
If we are to prepare teachers to incorporate this view of education into their 
practice, we need to place a great deal of emphasis in facilitating aesthetic experiences in 
our work with teachers. In this, the teacher’s own self would be developed and refined, 
as we have seen that this is inherent within aesthetic experience. But we would need to 
go even further than this in preparing teachers. In addition to nurturing the teacher’s 
self in a general way through facilitating experiences that are rich with the quality of 
doing and undergoing, I believe we should do so with an eye toward expanding their 
capacity to experience transitional phenomena. In addition, we need to prepare teachers 
to be acutely attuned to the experience of others in order for them to be able to facilitate 
aesthetic connections in their work with students.  
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Above all, I believe it is paramount that teachers have an experiential basis upon 
which to draw in their practice with students in order for them to be able to incorporate 
this view of education into their work with students. Although I have worked hard to 
espouse this view from a theoretical standpoint, I maintain that the standpoint of 
experience has far more to offer than any theoretical explanation could provide in this 
regard. Thus, while it would be important for teachers to have a theoretical 
understanding of this approach in order to be more deliberate and discerning in their 
practice and in order to explain the significance of this approach to administrators and 
other educational stakeholders, an experiential basis that lacks any explanatory power 
would do far more in supporting students than a perfect theoretical grasp that somehow 
lacked an experiential basis could possibly yield.  
Thus, in addition to mastery within certain academic domains this approach tells 
us that teachers must also have the capacity to play within those domains in order to 
cultivate the aesthetic mode of learning. In this, teachers would be able to support 
students in opening up their very selves through an experience that is rich with the 
quality of doing and undergoing in which student and teacher alike engage with the 
quality of play. In this realm of experience, a lesson in poetry, anatomy, or algebra 
invites students to learn about the world through these various disciplinary lenses as 
they incorporate their interactions with this subject matter into their way of being in the 
world. Thus, learning unfolds on a very deep level as the self is refined in relation to the 
world. But in order to support students within this realm of experience teachers, 
themselves, need to have a well developed capacity to enter this realm of transitional 
phenomena.  
	   123 
While the basic capacity for transitional phenomena would necessarily have been 
established long before teachers would ever enter our classrooms, this only tells us that 
we have a foundation on which to build. Thus, one role of teacher education is to further 
expand and refine this capacity by fostering experiences that are rich in the quality of 
relation that is central to aesthetic experience and meaning making. We need to 
incorporate play into our work with teachers. We need to help teachers to become ever 
more attuned to the particulars of the world within their domains of study while also 
maintaining acute awareness of the quality of relation this attunement brings forth 
within experience. We need to notice when our efforts to facilitate aesthetic experiences 
fall short and work to understand why this might be the case. Although the reasons for 
such “failures” will be many, I bring this up because such instances might indicate 
places in which we can work to expand teachers’ capacitates to experience transitional 
phenomena and thus to further cultivate the self of the teacher. 
Underlying these suggestions is the notion that while aesthetic experiences in 
themselves have inherent value, it is at the same time true that aesthetic experiences also 
have an instrumental value in developing the capacity for further aesthetic experiences 
and aesthetic culminations. This concept is foundational to the practice of 
psychoanalysis and the work of Winnicott in particular in which “for both patient and 
analyst playing replaced knowing as the aim and the means of analysis.”1 Furthermore, 
Dewey, too, upheld this view. In Experience and Nature Dewey described art as an 
activity that directly refreshes and enlarges the “spirit” and is “instrumental to the 
production of new objects and dispositions which are in turn productive of further 
refinements and replenishments.”2 In other words, art (or aesthetic experience) is 	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instrumental toward the achievement of further consummatory experiences “because [it] 
is charged with an office in quickening apprehension enlarging the horizon of vision, 
refining discrimination, creating standards of appreciation which are confirmed and 
deepened by further experiences.”3 Thus, we find that aesthetic experience refines the 
self such that we become ever more closely attuned to the aesthetic connections between 
self and world that foster growth.  
The Scope of Implementation 
In applying this idea to teacher education, I maintain that we should aspire to 
cultivate as many moments of aesthetic experience as possible, but we must also 
recognize that the degree of implementation could vary significantly without 
undermining the basic idea that cultivating aesthetic attunement is important in 
education. As such, we should keep in mind that every little bit helps and that 
incorporating this view into educational practice is ultimately about a process of 
continual aspiration.  The aim is to keep going and growing. In Winnicott’s conception, 
this is an aim toward creative living—the very thing that gives meaning to life itself.  
Stated more concretely and with explicit focus on the work of teachers, Kevin J. 
Pugh and Mark Girod address a version of this idea that applies explicitly to the context 
of schools and teachers. All the while advocating for science teachers to incorporate 
transformative aesthetic experiences within their classrooms, Pugh and Girod recognize 
that there are challenges involved in the implementation of this approach. One 
significant challenge has to do with the very real limitations such as time and energy 
that teachers inherently face. 
One concern is that this teaching may be too labor intensive. It takes significant 
time to craft the content in an artistic way and to develop and model a passion 	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for the content. With teachers’ heavy loads and the common practice of teachers 
being asked to teach outside their main area of interest and expertise, we 
speculate that it would be difficult for teachers to teach for transformative, 
aesthetic experiences all the time. Instead, they may need to focus on fostering 
transformative, aesthetic experiences with a few concepts and, over time, build a 
repertoire of methods for teaching concepts in an artistic way.4 
 
Thus, even when implementation is necessarily limited by very real and legitimate 
constrains of educational practice, it is still worthwhile to incorporate this approach into 
our work with students to whatever extent is possible. 
However, I believe we can look even more deeply into the implementation of 
this approach within educational practice. While it is no doubt true that crafting lessons 
in an artistic manner would be important in implementing this view, I would like to 
stress that at the most basic level the aesthetic unfolding for which I am advocating 
occurs within moments that contain a certain quality of relation. Hence, momentary 
offerings of exquisite attention to objects, ideas, and to one another form the building 
blocks of implementation. In this, even if we do not yet have a full lesson plan or 
method, we can still advance this approach within meaningful moments of aesthetic 
attunement. Thus, implementation can quite literally vary on a moment-to-moment 
basis with the aspiration of cultivating as many moments of exquisite attention as we 
can. Over time, I believe that we will find an increased capacity for this quality of 
attunement—and this increased capacity may very well lead to an established 
“repertoire of methods for teaching concepts in an artistic way.”  
An Aesthetic Method of Teaching 
In emphasizing the smaller moment-to-moment scope, I am working to show 
what would underlie a “repertoire of methods” for teaching that would support this 	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approach. This opens an important discussion for the practice of teaching in general 
concerning the role of method within educational practice. Hence, while an established 
set of methods might be desirable for teacher educators and teachers alike, I believe we 
should take heed of an important concern that might ensue from such a desire. I believe 
there is potential for our aesthetic aim to be undermined where there is too strict an 
adherence to method. Indeed, if it is a quality of relation, fostered within moments of 
exquisite aesthetic attunement, that we are aspiring toward, we must remain deferential 
to emergent connections in order to foster such meaningful moments of attunement. As 
such, our teaching methods must allow for flexibility in order to remain open and 
responsive to emergent connections.   
Accordingly, I suggest that we draw on Dewey’s discussion within Experience and 
Education of the scientific method as a guide in determining how an aesthetic method of 
teaching might work.  
I am aware that the emphasis I have placed upon scientific methods may be 
misleading, for it may result only in calling up the special technique of 
laboratory research as that is conducted by specialists. But the meaning of the 
emphasis placed upon scientific method has little to do with specialized 
techniques. It means that scientific method is the only authentic means at our 
command for getting at the significance of our everyday experiences of the world 
in which we live. It means that scientific methods provides a working pattern of 
the way in which and the conditions under which experiences are used to lead 
ever onward and outward.5 
 
In this, Dewey is advocating for the “intelligently directed development of the 
possibilities inherent in ordinary experience”6—and I believe gets us well on our way 
toward an aesthetic method of teaching. Indeed, for Dewey  
The difference between the esthetic and the intellectual is thus one of the place 
where emphasis falls in the constant rhythm that marks the interaction of the live 	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creature with his surroundings. The ultimate matter of both emphases in 
experience is the same, as is also their general form.7 
 
Thus, an aesthetic method of teaching would be very close to Dewey’s understanding of 
the scientific method—the most important aspect of both being experiential awareness 
of the intimate connection between self and world.  
As Thomas Alexander conveyed, we find Dewey’s paradigmatic understanding 
of experience itself within his notion of aesthetic experience and this “lead[s] to a more 
coherent understanding of the rest of Dewey’s philosophy.”8 Thus, I believe that we are 
now in position to better understand Dewey’s educational philosophy precisely because 
we have been attending to and deepening Dewey’s aesthetic philosophy throughout. 
Indeed, I believe that this discussion leads to a richer understanding of what Dewey put 
forth in works like School and Society, Democracy and Education and Experience and 
Education by calling out the significance of aesthetic experience. In this, considerations of 
aesthetic experience reveal deeper insights about Dewey’s approach to education, while 
Dewey’s discussion of education extends this significance more broadly by helping us to 
understand how we might use these insights within educational practice.  
Getting the “Sound” in their “Ears” 
Years ago, when I was a student teacher I was given some advice by my 
supervisor that has stayed with me throughout the years. At the time I was working 
with a prominent high school band and my supervisor told me that above all I should be 
sure to keep the sound of that particular band in my ear and work to recapture it in my 
subsequent work with my own students. Although his advice was specifically referring 
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to the tone quality that this particular concert band was exhibiting, I think there is a 
deeper lesson to be extracted from his words.  
That band had a wonderful sound—it was solid and well supported because of 
the balance among the instruments. The individual tones of the various instruments 
blended together, merging into an ensemble sound. The students listened to one another 
and adjusted what they did as individuals to match what they heard around them. It 
takes great care to play in tune and in time with a large group and the only way to play 
with that kind of ensemble sound is for each individual to offer exquisite attention to 
what they are doing in relation to what is going on around them. Thus, my supervisor’s 
advice necessarily extends beyond sound alone because in order to recapture that 
ensemble sound in my work with future students I would also be recapturing this 
quality of exquisite attention and responsiveness to the world.  
This quality of exquisite attention and responsiveness is something that is 
exhibited particularly well in the arts. As such, I believe the arts offer us prime examples 
of the quality of relation we should be aiming for. Extending my supervisors advice to 
teacher education, I maintain that we must work to provide examples of this quality of 
relation in our work with teachers so that they too will be able to keep that “sound” in 
their “ears” as they subsequently work with students. Furthermore, it should come as no 
surprise that the arts offer examples of some of the best ways to accomplish this.  
In some ways I am suggesting that we educate teachers in a manner that is 
similar to how we educate musicians. Becoming a musician requires extended practice 
and sequential development. Musicians need to spend many hours practicing everyday. 
They practice alone, they practice in groups, they practice with individual teachers, they 
practice when they are away from their instruments through mental exercise alone, and 
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they practice by attending closely to the performances of others. As much as it is 
important to stress the amount of time spent practicing, it is important to stress what all 
this practicing does. Yes, of course practicing is about becoming more proficient and 
performing well at the next concert or recital, but it is also about building up an internal 
working model of what to aim for. In this, music teachers are not only seeking to correct 
and offer guidance for the next performance, music teachers are working to build up 
and refine students’ inner working models of what an excellent performance is. They are 
working to get that “sound” in students’ “ears.”  
By extension, in order to get that “sound” in teachers’ “ears” we need to allow 
for lots of time spent practicing and we need to do so such they build up and refine a 
working model of what they should be aiming for. In some ways, it is easier to talk 
about this inner working model in terms of sound because there are very specific 
qualities and properties that we can refer to and measure with sound.9 But 
unfortunately, it is difficult to be so specific when it comes to the inner working model 
that I believe teachers need to cultivate. Teachers need to know in themselves what it 
feels like to offer exquisite attention. They need to be able to recognize when others are 
affording such attention to the world. They need to know what it feels like when 
someone responds to them with exquisite attention. They need to recognize when the 
“fit” is not quite right. And above all we need to build up their inner working models 
through experience so that they can feel and respond to the right “fit” when they come 
across it.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 However, this does not address the constructed experience with sound, which is not objective. 
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Museum Teaching as a Model 
In a recent book entitled Teaching in the Art Museum: Interpretation as Experience, 
Rika Burnham and Elliot Kai-Kee describe a model of dialogic gallery teaching that I 
believe does an exceptional job at exemplifying how we might foster the quality of 
relation we should be aiming for in teacher education. This model explicitly aspires to 
cultivate an environment that is supportive of what Dewey referred to as “an 
experience” as the gallery teacher encourages museum visitors to share their 
impressions and interpretations of artworks with one another. In this model, the gallery 
teacher’s role is to “advocate for the endeavor as a whole. As she moves, follows, or 
opposes at various points in a dialogue, she is conscious of the well-being of the 
enterprise.”10 In this, the teacher’s role is to serve as a catalyst for “an experience” as she 
helps the dialogue to progress “from anticipation, through the stages of conservation, 
cumulation, and tension, and arriving eventually at culmination and fulfillment”11—that 
is, if all goes well. Although there are important differences between an art museum and 
the context of teacher education that would no doubt involve modifying this approach 
to meet the context of our classrooms and universities, I think we have a great deal to 
gain from considering this approach as a model for how we, too, might cultivate “an 
experience” in our work with teachers.  
Burnham and Kai-Kee discuss the place of authority within gallery dialogues 
and I think their insights on the matter stand to inform how we, as teacher educators, 
might relate to our students. The authors point out that “There is a place for authority in 
the dialogic relation, but it should be sustained by the interchange itself. Indeed, gallery 
teachers must be careful that the authority automatically granted them does not inhibit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Rika Burnham and Elliot Kai-Kee, Teaching in the Art Museum: Interpretation as Experience (Los Angeles: 
Getty Publications, 2011), 92.  
11 Ibid.	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visitors’ exchange of views.”12 I think we face a similar concern in our work with 
teachers and that we must be mindful of the relations of power at play within 
classrooms. While it need not be a problem that we, as instructors, have some measure 
of power or authority from the get go, it is important that this does not get in the way of 
fostering the quality of relation we are aiming to foster. If our students feel inhibited, the 
aesthetic mode of learning will not come to fruition. Inhibition can come from many 
sources and I believe we must do our part to earn and support others in earning what 
Burnham and Kai-Kee refer to as “true authority.” “True authority in dialogue is 
earned—in the course of the dialogue itself—by contributions of knowledge, observation, 
and insight on the part of all the participants.”13 As such, I believe we should construct 
environments that are rich with opportunities for exquisite attention and work to foster 
this through supporting a space of wonder and open exchange in which we closely 
attend to what our students are experiencing in order to help guide and facilitate the 
experience.  
Although there are rich examples of gallery dialogues provided throughout this 
text, chapter seven, entitled “Information in Gallery Teaching: Charles Le Brun’s Water 
Tapestry,” offers a particularly good example of this mode of teaching. In this, I believe 
we find an example of the role of the teacher that Dewey described in School and Society.  
Thus, Dewey portrays a mode of engagement in which the teacher keeps one eye on the 
student by closely attending to the student’s emerging interest. The other eye is on the 
subject of study—in this case the subject being the tapestry, Water. Throughout the 
exchange the teacher helps the student to navigate by directing the student in ways the 
teacher knows to be productive, given his or her expertise in the subject. But there is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., 91.	  
13 Ibid.	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very real danger of the teacher’s expertise taking over the experience and limiting the 
quality of engagement we are aiming to foster. As Burnham conveys,  
[I]f, in our enthusiasm to open up the work, we succumb to the temptation to 
pour out information too soon, too fast, in the wrong sequence, or too 
abundantly, we can end up with a group that may follow along attentively as we 
in effect narrate the work for them, but that never really looks and sees the image 
before them, never discovers it for themselves.14 
 
Alas, I think this situation describes what occurs in schools too much of the time and 
that there is a great deal we can learn from the model of gallery dialogues.15  
In a concluding chapter, Burnham raises a particularly interesting issue by 
looking at what we should be aiming for within a single lesson of this aesthetic mode of 
teaching. In this, rather than asking what we aspire to accomplish on a large scale by 
considering broad outcomes of a long educational process, Burnham considers a much 
more modest scope. While some might note the distinction between the contexts of 
teaching in an art museum during a single visit, as opposed to years spent in teacher 
education, I believe the question pertains to teacher education at the level of each 
individual lesson. In short, Burnham is asking whether we should be aiming for grand 
transformative experiences that enable students to see the world in a new way or 
whether we should be more modest in our aspirations and work to facilitate rich 
experiences with artworks.  
Underlying this question is the observation that sometimes students have 
singular experiences that culminate in a way that does seem to change their very being 
in this world. This is powerful. This type of profoundly educative experience is at the 
heart of this entire approach. Yet, Burnham cautions against having such grand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid., 123. 
15 This kind of problematic phenomenon occurs too often in music education when ensemble directors focus 
on just the sound of the group, correcting and directing the interpretation without engaging the members of 
the ensemble.	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expectations and instead offers that the teacher’s aim should be on the quality of 
experience generated (and that is all). Despite the fact that I am advocating for a view of 
education that does transform the self, I agree with Burnham. As Dewey says, “Like the 
soil, mind is fertilized while it lies fallow, until a new burst of bloom ensues.”16 Hence, I 
believe the quality of relation, exemplified in the gallery dialogues that Burnham and 
Kai-Kee describe, is fertilizer for the self. While sometimes we may be present for the 
emergence of a new burst of blooms, how and when this kind of transformation occurs 
is not for us to determine. I believe Burnham is right to caution against teaching 
specifically for this type of transformative experience because doing so might 
undermine the very quality of relation that fosters this larger process of educating the 
self.  
Indeed, I believe the theory I present throughout upholds one very basic insight; 
namely, that it is a quality of relation between self and world that fosters a profound 
aesthetic unfolding. In this, we find the growth and development of the self. We learn 
and grow aesthetically through our experiences of interactions with our environment. 
Some experiences and interactions are more helpful than others in this process. Those 
that are the most helpful are experiences that contain a rich quality of relation between 
self and world and it is these types of experiences that we should be working to 
cultivate. Examples from the arts prove to be excellent in exemplifying this type of 
unfolding and I believe this is because the arts themselves are an outgrowth of our 
intimate connection with the world. Furthermore, in understanding and, more 
importantly, experiencing this aesthetic unfolding we are in a much better position to 
support others in this process of educating the self through aesthetic experience. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Dewey, Art as Experience, 24.  
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